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Abstract 
This dissertation aims to address the security issues of insider cyber-physical attacks and 
provide a defense-in-depth attack-resilient control system approach for cyber-physical systems.  
Firstly, security analysis for cyber-physical systems is investigated to identify potential risks 
and potential security enhancements. Vulnerabilities of the system and existing security 
solutions, including attack prevention, attack detection and attack mitigation strategies are 
analyzed.  
Subsequently, a methodology to analyze and mathematically characterize insider attacks is 
developed. An attack pattern is introduced to represent key features in an insider cyber-physical 
attack, which includes attack goals, resources, constraints, modes, as well as probable attack 
paths. Patterns for such attacks are analyzed for different attack stages. Impacts and 
consequences of these attacks are analyzed by using an attack tree. Stealthy conditions of 
insider attacks are identified through temporal and spatial analysis, respectively. 
On the defense side, a cross-layered detection scheme is developed to reveal stealthy insider  
attacks, and an attack-resilient control scheme is proposed to mitigate impacts of these attacks. 
The detection scheme includes a hierarchical approach by incorporating different detection 
methods in multiple layers to provide a defense-in-depth detection against the attacks. A 
model-based anomaly detection method is used to uncover the anomalies caused by temporal 
stealthy attacks, while a data-driven clustering detection method is used to recognized 
anomalies induced by spatial stealthy attacks. The attack-resilient control scheme consists of a 
decision logic and multiple attack-resilient controllers. The decision logic responds to the 
anomalies identified by the detection scheme and subsequently switches to suitable controllers. 
These controllers are designed to respond to these attacks and mitigate or minimize their 
impacts.  
To validate the above methodologies, a general guideline for designing an experimental 
security assessment platform has been developed in this dissertation. Furthermore, a modular 
approach is proposed to design and implement a platform to simulate various insider attacks 
and to evaluate corresponding defense mechanisms on a cyber-physical system. The designed 
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platform has been implemented on a physical component based dynamic system simulator, 
known as Nuclear Process Control Test Facility (NPCTF). The proposed vulnerability 
assessment and security enhancement techniques have been validated under different insider 
attacker scenarios. 
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Chapter 1  
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background  
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) can be essentially viewed as a physical process and its 
corresponding control systems connected through some form of common communication 
networks [1], as is shown in Figure 1.1. Data between the physical process and the control 
system are transmitted through communication networks for monitoring and control purposes 
[2]. Because the networks can also be used by potential adversaries, it opens up potential entry 
points for them to tamper with the transmitted data. Adversaries might even gain access to 
safety-critical system information by exploiting weaknesses of networks or communication 
protocols. Due to cyber-physical interactions, malicious adversaries might manipulate the 
transmitted data to disrupt the physical process through cyber means, which is referred herein 
as cyber-physical attacks [3]. If these attacks are targeted to safety-critical processes, they can 
cause immense damage in the physical parts of the system and even endanger human lives.  
 
Figure 1.1 Diagram of a cyber-physical system 
Cyber-physical attacks can come from either an insider threat or an external threat. The insider 
threat is the most daunting challenge to handle [4], it is because that insider attackers usually 
have legitimated access to the targeted resources and may even know how to carry out 
Physical processes 
Cyber systems 
(Computation and control) 
Communication networks 
(Data transmission)
Sensor measurements Control commands 
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destructive actions while avoiding being detected [5]. A well-publicized insider attack is on 
the Maroochy Shire Council’s sewage control system in Austria [3]. There are also many 
cyber-attacks targeted on safety-critical systems that take advantage of the insider knowledge 
and cause adverse effects on physical processes. Stuxnet on Siemens PLC systems by 
introducing a malware capable of modifying internal commands [6]. In 2013, Havex attack 
was meticulously prepared to remotely compromise the industrial control systems and caused 
massive damages in safety-critical infrastructures [7]. Black energy attacked Ukrainian power 
grids in 2015 by seizing control of SCADA systems to deliberately switch off substations to 
cause wide-area blackouts [8].  
There are two unique features commonly in these attacks: 
1) All these attacks are stealthy. In all the cases, attackers are able to gain access into 
the system and leverage their inside knowledge about the system to bypass the anomaly 
detection schemes and achieve their attack goals without triggering any alarms [9].  Even 
though there are many security measures implemented to fence off external attackers in the 
cyber-physical systems, such as intrusion detection, data encryption and access control 
mechanisms, they may be ineffective to insider attacks.  
Therefore, it is of great significance to find security solutions that can extract the features 
of insider attacks, identify system vulnerabilities related to insider attacks, and manage the 
security risks respect to insider attacks. 
2) All these attacks are enabled due to cyber-physical interaction. Attackers have taken 
advantage of the cyber-physical interactions inside the system. They have compromised 
the network and tampered the transmitted data in the cyber layer, then used the cyber-
physical interdependencies to manipulate the process operation and caused severe physical 
damage without being detected.  
Hence, the security of cyber-physical systems requires analysis of both cyber layer and 
physical process, and their interactions [10]. Methods that integrate cyber-physical security 
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and control theory are needed to provide attack detection and resilient control against insider 
cyber-physical attacks, which is the focus of this dissertation.   
1.2 Motivations  
Based on the analysis of the reported attack accidents, it is necessary to address the security 
challenge of insider cyber-physical attacks against cyber-physical systems, where the attacker 
can (1) tamper sensor readings or (2) manipulate control commands [11]. This kind of attacks 
are referred as insider attacks in this dissertation. 
Even though there are many researches on modeling and analysis methods of insider attacks, 
it is still challenging to describe features of attacks mathematically because attacks usually 
happen in unpredicted ways. Therefore, instead of identifying a specific model of attacks, it is 
necessary to analyze the resulting impacts of insider attacks on the CPS and develop 
corresponding countermeasures. 
A major distinction of cyber-physical security with respect to cyber security is the cyber-
physical interaction of the control system with the physical processes. Cyber-physical attacks 
originate from cyber space but have impacts on the physical processes.   
Traditionally, security issues of cyber-physical systems are mainly investigated from the 
perspective of information security with a focus on confidentiality, availability, integrity of the 
information in the cyber space [1]. While information security studies are key elements in the 
cyber space, they have less consideration on the interdependencies between the physical 
process and the cyber space. Moreover, such information security methods are not effective 
against insider attacks and they also fail against attacks targeting directly to the physical system 
dynamics. Thus, information security methods are not enough to secure cyber-physical 
systems. It is required to handle the cyber-physical coupling relationships and interactions. 
Therefore, one needs to consider cyber-physical interdependencies from a control system 
perspective, to enhance the security of cyber-physical systems. 
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For safety-critical CPS, the ultimate objective is to secure process and control mechanisms 
[12]. It is motivated to develop an attack-resilient control approach that can provide attack 
detection, protection and control for both cyber and physical aspects of the system. In order to 
analyze the impacts of cyber-physical attacks, and to validate the implemented security 
enhancement strategies, there is also a need of a security assessment platform to conduct 
experimental evaluation. 
1.3 Research scope 
This dissertation considers the security problem of cyber-physical systems against insider 
attacks from a control perspective. The focus of this work is on insider cyber-physical attacks, 
whereby the attacker is assumed to be able to interrupt the communications during the data 
transmission and tamper with the data of sensor measurements or control commands.  
The scope and assumptions of the research are listed as follows. 
 The inside attacker considered has access to the system or already inside the system, can 
compromise communication networks, tamper with the exchanged sensor measurements 
or control commands being sent and received, and cause damages to the physical process.  
 Attacks are considered being stealthy for the anomaly detection scheme that only detects 
if the transmitted data meets the physical laws or relationships which will not trigger an 
alarm. 
 The attack goal is to initialize an attack in the cyber space to cause impacts and damage 
on the physical process.  
 Attacks are assumed to happen in a single channel at a time, coordinated attacks are not 
considered in this dissertation.  
 The supervisory station is isolated from the rest of the system and is assumed to be secure. 
It contains a control system and an anomaly detection scheme.  
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 It is assumed that the supervisory layer is secure and could not be penetrated by the 
attacker. 
The focus of this dissertation is on providing security analysis on system vulnerabilities and 
threats with respect to insider attacks, and designing security enhancement methods to prevent, 
detect and mitigate the impacts of such attacks. This research consists of the following three 
core tasks, as is shown in Figure 1.2. 
Attack detection
Multi-layered defense
Resilient control
Vulnerability analysis
Attack analysis
Attack impact analysis
Security evaluation
Security analysis Security enhancement
 
Figure 1.2 Research focus of the dissertation 
Please note, terminologies used in the dissertation have been defined based on the industry 
standards ISA/IEC-62443: Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems: Technical 
Security Requirements for IACS Components [13], and related technical references.   
1.4 Contributions of the dissertation 
Based on the research tasks in Figure 1.2, the contributions of the dissertation can be 
summarized into three main groups: (1) security analysis, (2) security enhancement, and (3) 
security evaluation. 
(1) Security analysis 
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The contributions of this aspect are threefold.  
First, potential ways of breach of security in cyber-physical systems have been investigated 
and analyzed. Second, a unified formulation against insider attacks has been proposed. 
Features of insider attacks are extracted using an attack pattern. Lastly, stealthy conditions of 
insider attacks are identified based on a temporal and spatial analysis. Different attack 
scenarios and their impacts are represented through an attack tree. 
This analysis links attack threats with system vulnerabilities. The outcome of the analysis can 
then be used to improve the security of CPSs against potential insider attacks. Moreover, the 
dissertation has improved the existing work on attack pattern and stealthiness analysis against 
insider attacks.  
(2) Security enhancement 
The contributions on this topic can be highlighted in the following three aspects. 
First, an online cross-layered detection scheme has been designed to reveal potential anomalies 
in multiple layers. The detection scheme takes a hierarchical approach by combining different 
detection methods in respective layers to provide a defense-in-depth detection against attacks 
of different forms. A state estimation with CUSUM based detection method and a data-driven 
detection method are proposed to work together to detect stealthy attacks. The cross-layered 
detection scheme is proved to be effective, as shown by examples how attack-inflicted 
anomalies can be detected before the attack can cause significant impacts on the wellbeing of 
the physical process.  
The above cross-layered design has made notable improvements to the existing detection 
techniques that merely focus on network intrusion detection or anomaly detection in physical 
processes. The current design fuses data from both the cyber layer and the physical layer, 
integrates them with model-based and data-driven methods to provide a stronger and more 
robust defense-in-depth detection. 
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Second, an attack defensive framework has been developed in this work. This framework, 
combining attack prevention, anomaly detection and mitigation strategies, offers a defense-in-
depth protection against insider attacks to maintain the CPS in a safe state. By using the 
proposed framework, system security has been enhanced as attack anomalies are detected 
quickly, and the system operator can be alerted promptly to take actions and to mitigate impacts 
of the attacks. 
Third, this dissertation introduces an attack-resilient control scheme to mitigate effects of 
attacks, which includes an attack response scheme, a decision-making scheme and a set of 
switchable controllers. The attack response scheme can isolate and replace the corrupted data, 
the decision-making scheme can switch  in appropriate controller into the system, and the 
controller can mitigate the attack and bring the system to  a safe state. This work provides a 
temporary solution to protect the system before more permanent solutions can be taken by 
human operators to secure the system.  
(3) Security evaluation 
The contributions in this topic have two parts. 
First, a general design methodology for developing a security assessment platform has been 
developed, which provides an overview on how to develop a security platform on a cyber-
physical system. Modular design makes the development and implementation flexible. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no such platforms reported in the open literature.  
Second, security experimentation and associated performance evaluation techniques on a 
specific cyber-physical system have been carried out. Experimental case studies have 
demonstrated that the platform is capable of identifying system vulnerabilities, validating 
various detection and mitigation strategies, and evaluating system security conditions and 
providing insights for security enhancement. 
8 
 
 
 
1.5 Structure and organization of the dissertation 
The overall framework of the dissertation is outlined in Figure 1.3. 
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Figure 1.3 Overview of the topics covered in the dissertation 
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The dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 investigates the cyber-physical security issues related to insider attacks based on 
existing research work and literature. Risk assessment methods including vulnerability 
analysis, threat assessment and impact analysis are investigated and analyzed. Security 
enhancement strategies including topics on attack prevention, attack detection, and attack 
mitigation are surveyed and discussed. Meanwhile, security issues and challenges are also 
analyzed. 
Chapter 3 analyzes system vulnerabilities and potential insider attacks on the system. Cyber-
physical interactions and attack impacts are examined in the form of an attack tree. A specific 
analysis is demonstrated on a nuclear process control test facility (NPCTF). 
Chapter 4 presents a modular design of an experimental security platform. It develops a general 
design guideline for a cross-layered experimental security platform, and proposes a modular 
approach to design and implement a platform for security tests on cyber-physical systems. This 
chapter also describes the process of constructing a security platform prototype for a specific 
cyber-physical environment and the way to use it for various security assessments. 
Chapter 5 introduces a methodology on analysis and formulation of insider attacks through 
data tampering. Attack features are characterized by an attack pattern, stealthy conditions are 
analyzed, and impacts are also discussed. 
Chapter 6 provides a cross-layered detection approach to detect anomalies from different layers. 
It integrates network intrusion detection with physical process detection, and combines model-
based and data-driven detection algorithms to reveal various stealthy attacks. 
Chapter 7 presents an attack-resilient control system design, which includes a decision-making 
scheme to respond to the attacks resiliently, and an attack-resilient controller to mitigate the 
impact of attacks. This chapter also presents an attack defensive framework to provide defense-
in-depth protection for cyber-physical systems. 
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation and provides some discussions on future work in this area.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Investigation on Security of Cyber-Physical Systems 
under Insider Attacks 
2.1 Introduction 
Security is critically important to ensure a reliable operation of cyber-physical systems. The 
purpose of this chapter is to investigate techniques for security analysis and enhancement 
solutions, which can provide some references and guidance as how to design defensive 
strategies.  
Topics covered in this chapter are summarized in Figure 2.1. These topics can be classified 
into three categories: vulnerability analysis, threat assessment, and security enhancement 
strategies. System vulnerabilities and features of insider threats are analyzed and surveyed. 
Existing security solutions, including attack prevention, attack detection and attack mitigation 
strategies are also investigated.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, system vulnerabilities 
are surveyed. In Section 2.3, features of insider threats are discussed, attack models are 
investigated and methods to evaluate impacts of attacks are also summarized. In Section 2.4, 
a variety of security solutions including attack prevention, detection and mitigation techniques 
are surveyed and compared, secure architectures are discussed to develop a defense-in-depth 
control system. Finally, Section 2.5 presents some discussion and potential solutions on 
security of CPSs. 
2.2 Survey on vulnerability analysis related to insider attacks 
Cyber-physical systems are featured as tight coupling of cyber-physical components. This 
cyber-physical interaction has induced security vulnerabilities that might be exploited by 
attackers. Different approaches to identify potential vulnerabilities related to insider attacks 
have been studied recently. 
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Figure 2.1 Techniques investigated on security analysis and enhancement 
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A method based on fault tree analysis is used to identify process vulnerabilities to insider 
attacks in [4]. A graph-based model is proposed to determine inherent network vulnerabilities 
that could be exploited by a malicious insider in [14]. Several behavior-based models are 
proposed to establish the relation between the vulnerabilities and insider attacks in [4] and [15]. 
An insider threat model in [16] is established to acquire cyber situational awareness. Since a 
cyber-physical attack is initiated from the cyber domain, and then manifested to the physical 
domain, a successful insider attacker will have to combine knowledge from both domains to 
explore the vulnerabilities to inflict physical damage to the process. It is necessary to analyze 
the vulnerabilities among the cyber-physical couplings and interactions. Unfortunately, the 
interactions and dependencies between the cyber and physical components have not been 
considered in these techniques.  
2.3 Survey on threat assessment 
2.3.1 Cyber-physical attacks and their characteristics 
Insider attacks on cyber-physical systems can be classified by attack types, entry points and 
stealthy conditions, as summarized in Figure 2.2. 
Adversaries may interrupt the communication networks, tamper with the data packets being 
sent to the controller or eavesdrop to gain information on the system state [17]. Thus, the type 
of attacks can correspondingly be categorized into three groups: eavesdropping, denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks, and deception attacks [1].  
Eavesdropping attacks aim to intercept the network traffic and capture relevant information 
from the network traffic for later analysis, however, this kind of attacks will not have an impact 
on the physical process. DoS attacks aim to disrupt the data transmission by interrupting the 
communication networks. The deception attacks can compromise the integrity of data packets 
by tampering with the transmitted data between the physical layer and the cyber layer. 
Deception attacks can further be classified as false-data injection attacks, replay attacks and 
covert attacks. The characteristics of these attacks are described in Table 2.1.  
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Figure 2.2 Classification of insider attacks on cyber-physical systems 
A malicious attack could be carefully designed to compromise transmitted sensor data and 
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attacks are characterized analytically using an extended observer in [20].  
To study the stealthiness of an attack, a graph-based model is constructed to determine inherent 
network vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a malicious insider in [21]. State-estimation 
methods are used to characterize the unobservable attack in [22].  
To get the maximum attack impact, an DoS attack schedule is proposed to bypass intrusion 
detection mechanisms in [23]. To study the worst case that might caused by attacks, the 
maximum impacts of a DoS attack is studied in [24], and the worst damage of a false-data 
injection attack and the minimum number of the manipulated variables required by this kind 
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Table 2.1 Insider attacks on cyber-physical systems 
Attack type  Description   Reference  
Eavesdropping  Compromise the system and eavesdrop the transmitted data   [26] 
Denial of Service (DoS) 
Jam the networks traffic to make 
the communication channels 
unavailable 
[23] [24]  
Deception 
attack 
 
General deception 
attack 
Interrupt the data transmission 
and inject a malicious action  [27, 28] [26] 
False‐data injection 
attack 
Modify the transmitted data in a 
stealthy way 
[19] [18] [29] [30] 
[20] [31] [25] 
Replay attack  Use historical data to hide the current malicious action  [32] [33‐35]  
Covert attack 
Coordinate control signals and 
sensor measurements to hide the 
attack action 
[36]  
2.3.2 Modeling methods for insider attacks  
Attack models are used to map the insider threats to cyber-physical system vulnerabilities. In 
Table 2.2, attacks are analyzed based on control-theoretic, cyber security, and hybrid 
approaches separately.  
Several works in this field have focused on identifying models to characterize an insider 
attacker based on his/her psychological and behavioral characteristics. For example, an attack 
model is defined by attacker’s knowledge, disclosure resources and disruption resources in 
[43]. An insider deception model based on a grounded theory method is used to identify the 
technical and behavioral features of insider attacks [44]. Attack vectors are identified based on 
the policy violations in [45]. A framework based on insider attacker-related behaviors and 
symptoms is proposed to describe insider attackers based on socio-economic aspects rather 
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than the system architecture have been discussed in [46]. A game-theoretic model is proposed 
to model and analyze the insider threats in [47].  
Table 2.2 Impact analysis of insider attacks from different perspectives 
Approaches Proposed techniques Reference
Control-theoretic 
Attack models, stealthy condition of attacks [32] 
Physical watermarking detection to replay attacks [37] 
Moving target detection [38] 
Characterization of robust estimation and control [39] 
Cyber security Sequence-aware intrusion detection system [40] Big data analytics for attacks on PLC [41] 
Hybrid approaches Attack graph generation [42] 
Most of these modeling work have been focused on modeling attacker’s behavior, there is 
fewer considerations which assess the insider threat in a control-theoretical manner. System 
vulnerabilities exploited by the insider attacks, physical impacts of the attacks, and system 
resources used by an attacker need to be studied in order to provide indications for a secure 
control system design. 
Furthermore, it is of the utmost importance to study the dynamics of the physical process under 
attacks, and to capture features caused by such attacks. An insider pattern is defined by its type, 
capabilities, objective, and strategy in [48]. A model based on a semi-Markov chain is 
presented to predict possible decisions by attackers  and to evaluate the system security in [49].  
An attack space has been defined according to the system knowledge, disclosure information, 
and disrupted resources in [32]. Some illustrative examples have been presented to show how 
an attack signal is injected into a state estimator in a stealthy way in [50, 51]. These research 
are focused on analysis of how insiders might attack from the perspective of an attacker’s 
behavior [4]. However, to secure the physical process, it is necessary to analyze the impact of 
the attacks on the physical process from a system point of view, to identify anomalies that an 
attack might manifest on the system.  Since attacks are initiated from the cyber domain, and 
then manifested to the physical domain, a successful insider attacker will have to combine 
knowledge from both domains to explore the vulnerabilities to inflict physical damage to the 
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process. It is necessary to analyze the vulnerabilities among the cyber-physical couplings and 
interactions. Unfortunately, the interactions and dependencies between the cyber and physical 
components have not been considered in these techniques. 
In order to capture the impacts of an insider attacker, a tuple has been used based on 
organization structure [52], to trace a sequence of attack actions leading up to safety violations. 
Attack models are represented using dataflow-based directed graphs in [53]. Similarly, attack 
trees [54], attack graphs [55], integrated fault-attack trees [56], and attack pattern trees [57] 
are all used to characterize insider attacks and their attack paths and steps.  These researches 
help to identify system vulnerabilities under insider attacks. 
2.3.3 Techniques for stealthy condition analysis 
The ultimate goal of an insider attacker is to drive some critical system variables into unsafe 
states without triggering any alarms by keeping the attack stealthy or delaying any detection 
or responses. A well-planned attacker might bypass the anomaly detection system or hide 
his/her actions for a long period.  An adversary is capable to tamper with the sensor data 
without raising an alarm, some examples are presented in [28, 58] [59] and [60]. Works on 
stealthy condition analysis are summarized in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 Review of techniques for stealthy condition analysis  
Type of attacks Description of stealthy condition Reference  
Replay Bypass the anomaly detector [32] [33] [62] 
False data injection attack Tamper the anomaly detector [51] [58] [65] 
Zero-dynamics attack Modify control commands to hide attacker’s actions [66] 
Covert attack Bypass traditional anomaly detectors [96] 
Surge attack, bias attack, 
and geometric attack Bypass traditional anomaly detectors [27] 
So far as keeping a cyber-physical attack stealthy, there are two main approaches: the first is 
temporal stealth attack to tamper the anomaly detection mechanism by injecting deceptive data, 
such as a deception attack [61], or a false-data injection attack [58]. The second approach is 
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spatial stealth attack to conceal malicious attacks using healthy historical data, such as replay 
attacks in [62]. A methodology is presented  to study stealthy attacks in [63]. Detectability and 
identifiability of a stealthy attack are defined in [64]. However, none of these studies have 
taken into account essential features of an insider attacker. As a result, many assumptions made 
in these works may not be directly applicable for attacks committed by an insider. Therefore, 
common characteristic of attacks and their impacts on cyber-physical systems need to be 
analyzed.  
2.3.4 Attack impact analysis 
Impacts of attacks can illustrate the security status of a cyber-physical system and provide 
insights on designing detection and mitigation schemes. Research work on impact analysis is 
summarized in Table 2.4. A game theory method is used to analyze the cyber threats within a 
cyber-physical system in [67]. Impacts of attacks on critical networks are evaluated in [68] and 
[69] to increase the resilience of cyber-physical systems. In order to analyze how an cyber 
attack can affect the physical process, a threat model is proposed in [70], possible 
consequences of DoS attacks and deception attacks are assessed. Impacts of combination 
attacks are considered in [71], and an aspect-oriented method is proposed to model these 
impacts in [72]. To better understand the attack impacts timely, an algorithm is presented in 
[73] to predict the possible consequences by attacks. In order to develop the characteristics of 
attacks, an attack description language is proposed in [74], however, this method can only be 
applied to known attacks. 
The above-mentioned methods mainly focus on analysis of insider attacks in the cyber domain. 
By combining information from both cyber and physical domains, it is more likely that a 
pattern from a cyber-physical attack can be revealed, and subsequent impacts can be alleviated. 
Therefore, to secure cyber-physical systems, system vulnerabilities should be analyzed in a 
general and systematic way. It is necessary to assess impacts of attacks on physical process,  
and analyze the interactions of the cyber system with the physical process.  
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Table 2.4 A literature review on methods for impact analysis 
Methods References 
Game theory method to analyze cyber-physical attacks [67] 
Analysis of attack impacts on networks [68] 
Cause-consequence relationship analysis  [69] 
Impact analysis on DoS and integrity attacks [70] 
Statistical analysis for various attack scenarios [71] 
Aspect-oriented risk assessment [72] 
Predictive risk assessment method [73] 
Qualitative and quantitative analysis for cyber-physical attacks [74] 
2.4 Investigation of security enhancement solutions 
Reviews on security solutions include prevention, detection and mitigation. Attack prevention 
is defined as the first barrier against insider attacks starting from the entry point. Attack 
detection techniques need to be built for all layers of a cyber-physical system, and mitigation 
mechanisms are initiated to respond and mitigate the impacts of the attacks. 
2.4.1 Attack prevention and detection 
Attack detection is to identify anomalies of the system. Attack detection techniques can be 
classified into two groups: (1) passive detection techniques to prevent attacks, and (2) active 
detection techniques to identify the anomalies of attacks. Active detection techniques can be 
designed as data-based methods or model-based methods. Related techniques are investigated 
in Table 2.5. 
Passive detection techniques mainly focus on  protecting the information security include 
firewalls, demilitarized zones  and network intrusion detections to prevent intrusions and 
misuse of access privileges.  Guidelines are proposed in [75] to design specific firewalls  and 
demilitarized zones to prevent the intrusions from the external network to the physical process. 
Intrusion detection methods are proposed in [76] and [77] to monitor the network traffics. 
These passive techniques can help to prevent intrusions form external or local networks. 
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However, they might be ineffective for sophisticated attacks and insider attacks. it is necessary 
to employ defense-in-depth detection strategies to provide a layered detection. 
Active anomaly detection techniques can be classified into data-based and model-based 
techniques. Data-based approaches does not require system and attack models, they detect the 
anomalies through machine-learning [80] and pattern recognition techniques [78, 79] for 
analyzing hidden patterns in the observed training data set. Model-based approaches are based 
on the parametric models under normal operations and under different attack scenarios. The 
detection decision rules are made on the residuals between system observations and model-
based system outputs, such as game theory [85], physical watermarking [90] and state 
estimation techniques [91-100]. However, the residuals are often not obvious due to the model 
uncertainties and noises, and the model might be utilized to bypass the detection schemes by 
sophisticated attackers. It is required to consider the  cumulative effects of insider attacks and 
the constraints of system models when designing a detection framework. 
Table 2.5 A literature review of prevention and detection methods 
Attack detection  Techniques  References 
Attack prevention  
Firewalls and demilitarized 
zones [75] 
Network intrusion detection [76] [77] 
Data-based 
detection 
Clustering [78, 79] 
Machine learning [80] 
Data fusion [81] [82] [83] 
Model-based 
detection 
Graph theoretic methods [84] 
Game theory [85] 
Gaussian authentication [86] [87] 
Fast greedy algorithm [88] 
Physical watermarking [37, 89] [90] 
State estimation [91-94] [95] [96] [97] [98] [99] [100] 
Rule-based detection [51]  
Hybrid detection [40, 42] 
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2.4.2 Mitigation methods 
Once safety violations or anomalies are detected, corresponding mitigation actions will be 
triggered. The objective of attack mitigation is to minizine impacts of the attack and recover 
the system operation as much as possible.   
There are two types of mitigation strategies: (1) proactive methods that mitigate the system 
prior to the detection of an attack and (2) reactive mitigation that takes actions only when an 
attack has been detected. This chapter investigates the related work of proactive methods, 
which is summarized in Table 2.6.  
Table 2.6 Review on mitigation methods 
Techniques Approaches References 
Game-theory control 
Dynamic zero-sum game theory and a jamming 
strategy [101] 
A receding horizon Stackelberg control law  [102] 
Resilient control 
Attack-resilient control with a distributed control 
methodology  [103,104,105]
Attack-resilient control through a time-trigger strategy [106] 
Attack-resilient control with a Kalman state estimator [107] 
A multiple-task robust controller  [108] 
Attack-resilient control using a hybrid model [109] 
A two-stage attack-resilient control system [110] 
Reconfiguration control for safety violations [111] 
Optimal control  
An optimal decoder to minimize the attack effects [112] 
Design of an optimal estimator to minimize the worst-
case impact [113] 
Horizon linear–quadratic control  [114] 
Predictive control A predictive control system to compensate for adverse effects [115] 
Networked control Contingency analysis to detect malicious control commands [116]  
22 
 
 
 
These methods include game-theory methods, resilient control method, optimal control method, 
predictive method, and network control method.  A dynamic zero-sum equilibrium control 
strategy is proposed to defend DoS attacks in [101] and a receding horizon control law against 
replay attacks is presented in [102].  Attack-resilient control designs are studied based on 
various  strategies, such as distributed controllers in [103, 104, 105],  multi-agent time-trigger 
strategies in [106], and state estimation through Kalman filter in [107]. Hybrid controllers are 
designed in [108] and [109] to defend stealthy attacks, a two-stage resilient control system is 
designed to respond and mitigate attack impacts. In order to minimize the attack impacts, 
optimal control is considered in [112], [113] and [114]. In order to compensate the adverse 
effects of  attacks, a predictive control system is demonstrated in [115], and a contingency 
analysis is given in [116]. 
However, most of these mitigation methods are designed based on known attacks, since the 
attacks are unknown and hard to predict, some of the impacts of attacks may not be acquired 
and mitigated effectively. A resilient defensive framework should be performed in multiple 
layers to secure the cyber-physical system.  
2.4.3 Security architecture development 
A secure architecture is also necessary to ensure the security of a cyber-physical system.  
Security enhancement solutions should be considered from the cyber layer to physical layer. 
Table 2.7 summarizes the design of security architectures from different perspectives. A data 
fusion-based framework is proposed in [117] in order to enhance the robustness of networks. 
The cyber-physical interactions of a resilient cyber-physical system architecture are discussed 
in [118]. A authentication architecture for a IoT system is studied to presented to enhance the 
end-to-end security. A cyber-physical security architecture is proposed in [119] from an 
information security perspective. A layered architecture is analyzed in [120] to improve the 
security of communication protocols. 
Security in one layer may not satisfy the required security requirements, hence there should be 
multi-layer security solutions to secure the cyber-physical systems. A defense-in-depth 
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security architecture is in need to accommodate various security solutions in multi-layer 
systems. Different defense-in-depth designs for CPS are presented in Table 2.8.  
Table 2.7 A literature overview of security architecture design 
Proposed approach References 
A fusion-based defense mechanism [117] 
Qualitative and quantitative analysis for cyber-physical interactions [118] 
IoT-based security architecture [119] 
An information security framework [120] 
Security architectures to study security of heterogeneous protocols [121] 
Table 2.8 Defense-in-depth solutions for security enhancement 
Design methods  Techniques References 
Single-layer 
solutions 
A comprehensive review on IDS 
techniques 
[122] 
IDS in cyber layer [35] 
Multi-layer 
solutions 
Distributed management and control 
of security 
[123] 
A framework for attack-resilient 
industrial control systems: Attack 
detection and controller 
reconfiguration 
[124] 
A comprehensive analysis of security 
objectives 
[125] 
A CPS security framework including 
multiple security mechanism 
[126] 
A cross-layer context-aware security 
framework 
[127] 
2.5 Discussions 
This chapter has summarized the related research works to secure control of cyber-physical 
systems against insider attacks.  Based on the review of existing work, there are mainly two 
aspects need to be studied for further research and improvements: (1) there is a need for risk 
assessment methods to address the attack impacts on physical processes from a control point 
24 
 
 
 
of view, provide indicators for security enhancement strategies; and (2) attack mitigation 
methods may be improved when a defense-in-depth structure and multi-layer redundant design 
are considered. 
The remaining chapters on this dissertation will focus on these two directions to enhance the 
security of the system. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Vulnerability Analysis under Insider Attacks 
3.1 Introduction  
One of the core features of cyber-physical systems is the tight cyber-physical connectivity and 
interactions. Malicious adversaries might use the cyber-physical couplings to launch cyber-
physical attacks on safety-critical processes and cause disruptions in operations of physical 
processes. To understand insider attacks on cyber-physical systems and develop a 
corresponding defensive framework, it is necessary to map out the relations from the insider 
attacks to the vulnerabilities within a cyber-physical system.  
There are two questions need to be answered when assessing the system security.  
(1) What assets in the cyber-physical system are vulnerable to insider attacks?  
This question is related to system vulnerabilities that might be taken advantage of by inside 
attackers.  
(2) What are the threats from insider attacks?  
This question can be answered by the analysis of possible attacks, including analysis of 
attack models and their impacts.  
To answer these two questions, this chapter analyzes system vulnerabilities under insider 
attacks. 
3.2 Definition of an insider threat 
An insider threat is defined by a unique set of attributes, which includes [128]:  
 Access: Insiders are those who have legitimate access to the targeted system or already 
gain control of the system. Malicious insiders might abuse such access to the targeted 
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resources and avoid being detected by access control strategies that are designed mainly 
to prevent against external intrusions [5].    
 Authorized resources: Insiders already have authorized resources to conduct operations 
for their assigned duties, which also give them accessible to the targeted resources and 
carry out destructive attacks.  
 Knowledge: Insiders already have certain degree of the knowledge of the targeted system 
and its security countermeasures. They may even know how to exploit the system 
vulnerabilities and carry out their malicious actions without being detected, which makes 
detecting, mitigating, or recovering from insider attacks extremely challenging [13]. 
Security issues associated with insider attacks normally have two unique traits: 
 Cyber-physical coupling: attacks launched from cyber space can cause physical damage 
in the processes.  
 Stealthy attacks: insiders could design their attacks in such a way to avoid being detected. 
3.3 Vulnerability analysis of cyber-physical systems 
Vulnerabilities are the weaknesses that an adversary could exploit and use to cause damages 
to the systems [126]. Analysis of vulnerabilities can identify the potential entry points and 
understand how an attacker might take advantage of the vulnerabilities to launch malicious 
attacks. The vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems can be classified into five categories 
[129]:  
 architectural vulnerabilities; 
 security policy vulnerabilities; 
 software and hardware vulnerabilities; 
 communication network vulnerabilities; and  
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 detection and control related vulnerabilities.  
In this chapter, vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems are analyzed in two aspects: 
hierarchical analysis and data flow analysis. 
3.3.1 Hierarchical analysis  
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Figure 3.1 Architecture and composition of a cyber-physical system 
The architecture of a typical cyber-physical system can be conceptually illustrated in Figure 
3.1 in three layers: cyber layer, cyber-physical layer and physical layer [130]. The cyber layer 
contains high-level human machine interface, control algorithms, information and data 
processing devices. Its functions include data processing, control command generation, and 
high-level process management and optimization [131]. The physical layer typically consists 
of sensors, actuators, and physical processes. These elements are generally in hardware forms. 
Cyber-physical layer consists of network infrastructure that facilitates data exchanges between 
the cyber layer and the physical layer. Communication protocols are used to ensure smooth 
cyber-physical interactions [132]. To analyze security of cyber-physical systems, Cyber-
physical security, all three layers have to be involved: (1) data processing and control in the 
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cyber layer, (2) data transmission in the cyber-physical layer, and (3) sensor measurements and 
control commands in the physical layer.  
3.3.2 Data flow analysis in a control loop 
In cyber-physical systems, there are two types of data flow in a control loop: sensor data flow 
and actuator data flow. In a cyber-physical system, the cyber system interacts with the physical 
system by reading the sensor data and sending the control commands through cyber-physical 
interactions. Sensor data flow and actuator data flow are interdependent, a change in one side 
will lead to changes in the other side [10].  
1) Sensor data flow. Sensor data are sensor measurements from the physical system, 
compromised sensor data may mislead the controllers to make false control commands and 
result in security violations at the physical system.  
2) Actuator data flow. Actuator data flow are transmitted from the cyber layer to the physical 
system. Such information in the cyber space can be used by attackers to cause undesired 
deviation in the operation of the physical system.  
3.4 Attack analysis 
3.4.1 Insider attacks on cyber-physical systems 
3.4.1.1 Potential entry points for insider attacks 
Potential entry points of cyber-attacks are labelled as A1- A8 in Figure 3.1. The nature of these 
attacks is explained in Table 3.1.  
Attacks initiated from points A1, A2 and A3 target the sensor measurement data and control 
commands. Under such attacks, adversaries may interrupt the communication connection, 
eavesdrop to gain information on the system state, or tamper with the transmitted data packets 
[17]. These intrigue activities can lead to: denial of service attacks(DoS), deception attacks, 
false-data injection attacks (FDI), and replay attacks. The adversaries might conceal other 
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illegitimate activities from human operators or event detection algorithms implemented in the 
supervisory system. Such attacks are called stealthy attacks. 
Attacks initialized at A4 and A5 can compromise the controller or the supervisory system or 
alter some system configurations [17]. Attacks launched from A6, A7 and A8 can be viewed 
as physical attacks.  
This dissertation mainly focuses on security issues as a result of cyber-physical attacks that 
tamper with the data streams to cause damages in the physical process. The attack surface is 
originated from A1, A2 and A3, possible attack scenarios can be summarized in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Potential entry points for insider attacks on CPS 
CPS 
layers  Label 
Entry points of 
attacks  Security issues  Attack scenarios 
Cyber‐
physical 
layer 
A1 
Communication 
network 
between the 
sensors and the 
controllers 
Interrupt the communication 
between the sensors and the 
controllers;  
Manipulate or/and eavesdrop 
measurement data sent to the 
controllers 
Denial of Service 
(DoS) attack 
Deception attack  
False‐data injection 
attack 
Replay attack 
A2 
Communication 
network 
between the 
controllers and 
the actuators 
Interrupt the communication 
between the controllers and 
the actuators; 
Manipulate or/and eavesdrop 
the data package sent to the 
actuators  
Denial of Service 
(DoS) attack 
Deception attack  
False‐data injection 
attack 
Replay attack 
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Cyber 
layer 
A3 
Communication 
network 
between 
controllers and 
supervisory 
systems 
Interrupt the communication 
between the controllers and 
the supervisory systems; 
Manipulate or/and eavesdrop 
the data package between the 
controllers and the 
supervisory systems 
Denial of Service 
(DoS) attack 
Deception attack  
False‐data injection 
attack 
Replay attack 
A4  Controllers 
Interrupt normal operations of 
the controlled process, 
manipulate the control logics 
in the controllers, or send 
tampered data to the 
supervisory system/detection 
system 
Denial of Service 
(DoS) attack 
Deception attack  
False‐data injection 
attack 
Ladder logic 
bombs[133] 
A5  Supervisory system 
Compromise the supervisory 
systems, change system 
configurations, or disrupt 
detection systems 
Malware, code or 
program injection 
Physical 
layer 
A6  Physical process Physical attack on physical processes 
Direct physical 
attacks 
A7  Sensors  Physical attack on sensors  Direct physical attacks 
A8  Actuators  Physical attack on actuators  Direct physical attacks 
3.4.1.2 Definition of a successful attack 
In this dissertation, a successful attack is defined as: (1) the attack goal has been achieved; 
and (2) the attack is stealthy before its goal is achieved.  
Given the attack goal, the attacker utilizes available resources to carry out a sequence of 
malicious actions. A successful insider attack can be marked by an action or actions that drive 
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a physical process beyond its safety limits while remaining undetected. This definition can be 
used to evaluate whether the attack is successful or not. 
A failed attack: The insider attack fails if it is detected before the attack causes safety issues 
in process variables. 
3.4.2 Attack trees 
A comprehensive attack tree that integrates anti-models are constructed to show the logical 
sequence of an attack. Attack tree relate the system vulnerabilities from the attacker’s entry 
points in cyber layer to physical processes. Anti-goals are used to model an attacker’s 
malicious intentions related to system vulnerabilities [164]. By constructing a comprehensive 
attack tree, attack anti-goals and steps can be mapped to system vulnerabilities.  
An attack tree is shown in Figure 3.2.  
Attack Goal G
Attack Sub-goal 
v(5) 
Attack Sub-goal 
v(4)
Attack Sub-goal 
v(3) 
Attack Sub-goal 
v(2) 
Attack Sub-goal 
v(0) 
Attack Sub-goal 
v(1) 
AND
AND
OR
 
Figure 3.2  An attack tree 
The construction of an attack tree starts from the identification of the attack anti-goal and sub 
anti-goals. The attack anti-goal, sub anti-goals, and attack steps are linked by logical 
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connective functions and subsequently a tree structure is formed. The synthesis of the tree is 
described graphically using connective symbols (AND, OR). The node that represents the 
attack goal is referred as a root node. When an attack sub goal is broken down further, the 
corresponding node is called a non-leaf node. Once an attack sub anti-goal is exhaustive, or 
when it is decided not to expand the analysis further, the corresponding branch is terminated 
with a leaf node.  
In this chapter, an attack tree with system state and attack scenarios has been constructed to 
identify the attack pattern from the cyber domain to the physical process.  
Procedures to construct a comprehensive attack tree is as follows: 
(1) Set attack goals and sub-goals; 
(2) Design attack mode scenarios; 
(3) Define the attack steps; 
(4) Link the attack steps as a chain to form a complete attack path; 
(5) Integrate common attack steps for different attack mode scenarios; and 
(6) Construct a complete attack tree. 
The attack tree is constructed from the top to the bottom, but the execution sequence of an 
attack is from the bottom to the top. The attack tree results from a graph theoretic analysis of 
the network, security of a network and its interaction with the physical processes can be 
analyzed based on the attack tree. 
The AND-OR refinement structure can be used to link sets of sub goals in an attack scenario. 
Each sub-goal in the attack tree is considered to be a vulnerability point in the system, v(0) is 
the entry point of an insider attack on the CPS, and G is the final attack goal.  
Thus, the vulnerability vector of each path ( )P i is: 
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 ( ( )) (0), (1), ,V P i v v G                                          (3.1) 
In order to identify the vulnerabilities, all the nodes and variables in each attack path are needed 
to form a valid attack path. 
3.4.2.1 Attack path identification using attack tree 
Attack paths and the corresponding steps can be identified based on the attack tree from the 
bottom to the top. An attack path not only reflects the cyber-physical interactions of the system, 
but also reveals the attack sequence hidden within the system. Attack steps based on the 
corresponding attack path can also be identified.  
For rest of this chapter, a practical cyber-physical system is used to illustrate the conception. 
This system is known as Nuclear Process Control Test Facility (NPCTF), as is shown in Figure 
3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3  Overview of the NPCTF 
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3.5 NPCTF environment 
In this dissertation, all case studies are implemented on NPCTF. As a foundation of the case 
study, this chapter analyzes the vulnerabilities and potential insider attacks. For generality and 
simplification, the following chapters will give brief introductions on NPCTF. 
3.5.1 Cyber-physical aspects of NPCTF 
NPCTF is designed as a general-purpose process control test facility, supporting research in 
instrumentation and control (I&C) at the Control, Instrumentation, and Electrical Systems 
(CIES) Research Laboratory at The University of Western Ontario (UWO) [134].  
NPCTF is a fully operational scaled version of a physical plant, which represents the relevant 
portions of a cyber-physical system. In order to provide accurate information and real-life 
experimentation capabilities, this facility consists of a physical simulator to mimic the 
dynamics of a nuclear power plant, real field devices placed in the physical environment, and 
real programmable logic controllers (PLCs), which generate and exchange data packets via a 
communication switch in the cyber layer. 
To identify the vulnerabilities related to insider attacks, the environment for a cyber-physical 
security platform used in the NPCTF is described as follows. 
3.5.1.1 Physical Process 
In NPCTF, sensor measurements and actuator signals are associated with the analog or digital 
data in thermal-hydraulic processes, controllers generate actual data packets and interact with 
field devices to carry out detection and control tasks. There are totally 19 AIs, 30 AOs, 8 DIs, 
14 DOs and 12 control loops in the NPCTF. Detailed description of the control loops can be 
found in [134]. 
Sensor readings and control signals are transmitted between field devices and PLC. Analog 
I/O messages are in the form of 4-20 mA signals that must be converted back and forth to their 
corresponding physical values.  
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Insider attacks on sensors and actuators will choose I/O messages between devices and PLC 
in NPCTF as input to attacks, which are exchanged through TCP/IP packets.  
3.5.1.2 Control System and Anomaly Detection System 
An ABB Freelance AC700 PLC is chosen to implement the protection and control for the 
NPCTF. The PLC receives measurements from the sensors and computes the corresponding 
control actions. Anomaly detection system is set based on the safety limits of the physical 
processes. Anomalies can be detected if a process variable exceeds the designated limits. The 
Anomaly detection system is also used to detect anomalies caused by attacks on NPCTF.  
The control algorithm and anomaly detection system are programmed in a Ladder logic 
diagram and sequential event logic diagram, using the ABB Control Builder F. Since there 
were no security checks for performing logic updates, an attacker can tamper with the sensor 
readings or control signals to the actuators through this vulnerability.  
3.5.1.3 Communication Network 
Measurement data from the sensors and actuator data sent to the actuators are collected as (AI, 
DI) and (AO, DO) and transmitted over the control network in the NPCTF. Information 
between NPCTF process and the ABB PLC is communicated via a field bus, and 
communication between PLC and HMI is based on TCP and UDP protocols.  
3.5.2 Vulnerability analysis of NPCTF 
For clarity of presentation, the heater control loop on NPCTF is selected as an example to 
analyze the system vulnerabilities. The heater control loop is shown in Figure 3.4. 
There are one actuator (C2) for regulation of heater power, and two sensors ( 1T , 2T ) for inlet 
and outlet temperature measurement in the heater control system, respectively, as shown in 
Figure 3.4. The outlet temperature 2T is regulated by the heater current C2 through a 
proportional (P) controller, when the sensor readings of 2T to the PLC decreases, the current 
signal C2 in the heater will increase accordingly. The anomaly detection system is designed 
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according to the minimum (LL) and maximum (HH) bounds defined by the system safety limit. 
The safety limit of water temperature 1T  and 2T are set at 37℃, which should not be surpassed, 
otherwise potential damages to the system can occur and force a system shutdown.  
 A3 
 A2  A1 
C2'
C2 
Device communication network
Sensor Heater Actuators 
Controller (AC700F)
Control communication network
Supervisory station
2T
2T
 
Figure 3.4 Cyber-physical attacks on the heater control loop 
ECCS (emergency core cooling system) is used as an emergency control when the system is 
in an unsafe state. 
The safety setting on the heater control system is given as follows: the safety boundary of  T1 
and T2 is set as <HH=35℃, LL=15℃>, and the set point is 37℃. The current C2 ranges from 
0 to 100%. 
The vulnerabilities of the heater control loop are analyzed by considering the following aspects. 
1) Architectural vulnerabilities 
There are three potential entry points on NPCTF for insider attacks, as listed in Figure 3.4. A1 
is the entry point to the sensor communication channel from the sensor measurements to PLC. 
A2 is the entry point to the control communication channel from PLC to the actuator of the 
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heater. A3 is the entry point to the communication network between PLC and the supervisory 
station. 
2) Security policy vulnerabilities 
Currently, there is only passive security policy, which is the firewalls and safety thresholds. 
Attackers may take advantage to intrude the communication network and attack the heaters of 
the system.  
3) Software and hardware vulnerabilities 
All the hardware on NPCTF have no safety and security protection. Most of the software are 
open-sourced and have no access control or encryption. This vulnerability  may open some 
backdoors due to the lack of security policies. 
4) Communication network vulnerabilities 
TCP and UDP are used in the communication network between PLC and the supervisory 
station, UDP protocol is vulnerable to most of the sniff tools. The attackers can compromise 
the communication network and deliver the attacks into the channel. 
5) Detection and control related vulnerabilities 
There are only passive detection measures, such as safety limit, firewalls are used in NPCTF, 
which is ineffective for insider attacks. The existing controller in the heater control loop is a 
PD controller for normal operation, which cannot maintain the system performance under 
various situations. 
Based on the knowledge of these vulnerabilities, an attacker can take advantage of cyber-
physical interactions and identified these vulnerabilities to design stealthy attacks and drive 
the system into unsafe state. 
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3.5.3 Insider attacks on NPCTF 
Based on the potential entry points, the insider can attack in the heater control system by three 
means: (1) attack by tampering with sensor data 2T ; (2) manipulation of the control commands 
C2; and (3) modification to the setpoints of 2T . Types of attacks may include false-data 
injection attack, replay attacks, and other more sophisticated deception attacks. 
Given that the attacker aims to attack the heater outlet temperature of 2T , an attack tree can be 
constructed to analyze these possible attacks in Figure 3.5. 
G: Attack goal
v3: Control law
v6: Modified 
C2
v7: Recorded 
T2
v2: Tampered 
T2 
Insider attack v1:Entry point A1 
v0: Sensor 
measurement 
T2
AND
OR
v5:Entry point 
A2 
v4: Control 
signal C2 
v10: Modified 
setpoint
v9:Entry point 
A3
v8:   Setpoint
v11: Physical 
law
OR
OR
 
Figure 3.5 Attack tree analysis of the heater control system 
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Based on the attack tree, it can be observed how an attacker can advantage of system 
vulnerabilities from the cyber space to physical process. Attack steps and attack path can also 
be derived from the attack tree. 
3.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a general analysis of the vulnerabilities subject to insider attacks are presented. 
Possible entry points and the corresponding insider attacks are listed based on the system 
architecture. An attack tree is used to analyze impacts of attacks and to demonstrate the 
relationship between system vulnerabilities and insider attacks.  
To demonstrate some basic concepts, a specific cyber-physical system, NPCTF, is used as an 
example in this chapter. A heater control loop in NPCTF is selected to demonstrate how an 
attack tree can be constructed. Based on the analysis and discussion in this chapter, various 
case studies will be carried out for specific aspects in attack generation, detection and defense 
in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Design of a Modular Platform for Security Assessment of 
Cyber-Physical Systems 
4.1 Introduction 
Many research works have been done recently to investigate security aspects of CPSs by 
developing techniques to identify vulnerabilities in existing systems that could potentially be 
exploited by attackers [135, 136] and assessing impacts in an event of a security compromise 
[137]. Subsequently, various detection and mitigation strategies are proposed to boost the 
security and to minimize the consequences of these attacks [32, 76]. However, before these 
techniques can be deployed in practice, it is necessary to evaluate their effectiveness first in an 
environment that resembles the realistic situation as much as possible. Due to destructive 
nature of some of the cyber-physical attacks, it may not be safe, nor practical to carry out some 
attacks on the real process being protected, even under strict control, just to validate the 
security measures. As a result, many results in the previous research works remain in an 
idealized and a theoretical level until they are fully battle-tested by experiments in a physical 
environment [138]. Hence, it is safe to say that the nature and effectiveness of many existing 
security protection, detection and mitigation techniques are still not yet truly dependable. 
To ensure the effectiveness of these techniques, it is essential to have a security assessment 
platform to analyze vulnerabilities in a cyber-physical system, and to experimentally validate 
and evaluate these techniques in a safe and controlled manner. Through this platform, one 
should be able to generate various attack scenarios after exploiting system vulnerabilities, and 
to implement different defense strategies, and finally to evaluate the strength of the security 
under various operating scenarios [139]. To meet the needs of simulating variety of attacks for 
different cyber-physical systems, it is highly desirable that the platform be modular and 
flexible. 
In this chapter, a generalized guideline for testing security of cyber-physical systems is 
developed. The platform is composed of four main modules. Various types of attacks can be 
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modeled in the Attack Scenario Generation Module. Detection of potential security threats and 
corresponding defense strategies are implemented in the Security Enhancement Module. The 
level of security for a cyber-physical system can be analyzed and assessed in the Security 
Evaluation Module. The Platform Management Module ensures smooth operation of these 
three functional modules in real-time.  
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed platform, an experimental demonstration has been 
carried out using a cyber-physical system in a laboratory environment. The case studies have 
shown that security test experiments can be tailored to evaluate various scenarios on such a 
platform.  The proposed platform can be used to explore system vulnerabilities, to evaluate 
security enhancement strategies, and to assess the system security.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes some of the existing work. Section 
4.3 presents technical requirements and desirable features of a security assessment platform. 
Section 4.4 describes the platform design in detail. Construction of prototype platform is 
covered in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 presents results of case studies to demonstrate the features 
and effectiveness of the platform. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes this chapter.  
4.2 Existing work 
Development of experimental cyber-physical security test platforms has been an active topic 
of research over the last few years. Several institutions have developed such platforms for 
validating and evaluating various cyber security tools and technologies. These platforms also 
create realistic environments for testing attack/defense scenarios. Some of the existing 
platforms are compiled in Table 4.1, categorized by their intended use, implementation details, 
and application domains. 
Most existing security platforms are focused on cyber-attacks originated from communication 
protocols or network configurations in cyber layers [147]. The main protections against such 
attacks are intrusion prevention and detection in the network, which strongly lean towards 
cyber security aspects. However, in a cyber-physical system, information in the cyber layer is 
closely coupled with the behaviors of physical process [153]. An evil goal of a perpetrator is 
42 
 
 
 
no longer merely to cause a network disruption, rather to inflict maximum damage to the 
physical process. Hence, further to the information in the cyber layer and the physical process, 
cyber-physical interactions and their interdependencies need to be considered when securing 
a cyber-physical system. For this purpose, a cross-layer platform is needed to support in-depth 
study of various aspects of cyber-physical security issues. 
Table 4.1 Existing security testing platforms  
Classification  Categories   References  
Use of the 
platform 
Cyber security 
[139],  [140],  [141],  [139,  142‐
145],  [146,  147],  [148],  [149, 
150]  
Control theoretic‐based security  [151],[152] 
Physical vs 
simulation in 
implementation  
Real cyber, real physical  [140], [141], [142]  
Real cyber, simulated physical  [139, 143, 144]  
Simulated cyber, real physical  [146, 147] 
Simulated cyber, simulated physical  [148],[152] 
Hybrid (hardware‐in‐the loop)  [151], [149, 150] 
Targeted 
domains 
Smart grids  [139,  143,  144]  [146,  147], [148] 
Power systems  [142], [149, 150] , [152] 
SCADA  [146, 147], [148] 
Water treatment plants  [151],[141] 
From an operational safety point of view, a control system for the CPS should be designed 
such that, when a malicious attack is detected, the safety of the system should be maintained. 
For this reason, the platform must be implemented in such a way to automate test workflows 
and accommodate cyber-security evaluation through various test cases, while maintaining 
safety for entire system. In other words, the platform needs to integrate both cyber-physical 
security functionalities and control system actions within the same framework. To the best of 
our knowledge, there are no such platforms reported in the open literature.  
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There are various implemented methods to present a cyber-physical environment with different 
research concerns. With heavily inclined focus on cyber security over cyber-physical security, 
many existing security platforms are implemented using high-fidelity models or even real 
cyber components for the cyber parts, but with much simplified or even software simulated 
physical processes, such as in [139, 143, 144]. Unfortunately, an overly simplified physical 
process may not be able to provide in-depth information on the behavior of actual physical 
process, its control systems, and more importantly cyber-physical interactions during an attack.  
It is shown that the platforms built on physical installations in [146, 147] do provide more 
insightful responses from the physical processes. One can also capture interactions among 
cyber and physical parts for realistic cyber-physical system interactions in the security 
experiments. However, the use of physical components does not always guarantee repeatability 
as there are so many uncontrollable factors involved. It is also difficult to maintain original 
system functionalities, especially when attack tests are underway.  
On the other hand, platforms based entirely on simulation in [148] and [152] provide strong 
repeatability, but they only represent a limited number of practical scenarios. The results of 
tests may not be representative, and test credibility could be in question for general cases, 
especially when cyber-physical interactions are strong and interdependent. However, although 
these implemented methods provide various solutions on how to reproduce a specific cyber-
physical environment, discussions on how to develop and conduct security tests based on the 
implemented cyber-physical environment are very limited.   
Thus, it is necessary to extract key features of a security platform and to design a generalized 
prototype security platform that is applicable to different cyber-physical systems. In addition, 
it would be helpful if the common aspects could be extracted into a modular design, as it 
provides flexibility to add or change features to support various test scenarios for different 
security concerns.  
Furthermore, many existing researches on cyber-physical security platforms are domain-
specific, such as power systems [142], [149, 150] , [152] and water treatment plants [151], 
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[141]. One of the reasons might be that domain knowledge and specific implementation details 
may be relevant to understand the mind of a potential attacker. However, there are many attack 
scenarios are common across different application domains. It would be useful to develop some 
general design guidelines for test platforms to investigate various security issues independent 
of domain of applications.  
After a literature review, the following shortcomings in the existing platforms have been 
identified: 
 Most of works in the context of security platforms are focused on cyber security, lack of 
works to study cyber-physical security, and to combine cyber-physical security and 
control systems for securing a cyber-physical system.  
 There are currently no generalized design methods on how to design a security assessment 
platform. 
 There are no modular design and implementation of security testing platforms in the 
published work. 
This chapter provides a design method for an experimental security assessment platform to 
address the above-mentioned shortcomings and meet the comprehensive requirements of a 
cyber-physical security test platform. Key features of the proposed platform are:   
 Provide general design methodologies for different cyber-physical systems found in 
different domain of applications; 
 Adopt a modular design philosophy so that different modules can be selected and 
assembled to meet unique needs in different security evaluation scenarios; and 
 Support cross-layer tests for cyber-physical security and combine control system design 
with the consideration of cyber-physical security. 
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4.3  Platform requirements 
The functionalities of the platform are as follows. 
 Identify vulnerabilities in both cyber and physical layers that might be exploited by 
attackers; 
 Generate various attack scenarios to expose and identify vulnerabilities of the cyber-
physical system and to understand the cascading effects of an attack; 
 Develop and validate different cyber-physical security enhancement solutions to increase 
system resilience; and 
 Evaluate the results of security tests and provide insights and procedures for mitigating 
the effects of the attacks and minimizing their impacts. 
According to the expected functions, the proposed platform is decomposed into three main 
functional modules and one Platform Management Module. The three functional modules are: 
(1) Attack Scenario Generation Module, (2) Security Enhancement Module, and (3) Security 
Evaluation Module. The modules and their respective functionalities are summarized in Table 
4.2. Requirements of each module is analyzed according to the expected functionalities. 
4.3.1 Requirements of functional modules 
4.3.1.1 Requirements for Attack Scenario Generation Module 
Vulnerabilities can be identified by analyzing potential avenues that an attacker could take to 
mount an attack. For this purpose, attack scenarios need to be generated and their profiles need 
to be extracted. This module is known as Attack Scenario Generation Module. The module 
should be able to generate both preprogrammed attacks and customized attacks based on the 
specific research interests and practical concerns. The preprogrammed attack scenarios can be 
generated automatically or manually, other attacks can be generated by the users based on their 
specific knowledge and acquired resources. 
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Table 4.2 Summary of functional modules 
Functional 
Modules  Functionalities  Description 
Attack  Scenario 
Generation 
Module 
Vulnerability analysis Explore existing vulnerabilities  
Attack tests 
Generate different attack scenarios to examine 
how an attack could inflict physical damage from 
the cyber domain 
Impact assessment  Assess the impact of various attacks 
Security 
Enhancement 
Module 
Tests  of  detection 
methods  Implement different detection rules 
Tests  of  defense 
strategies 
Reconfigure  and  perform  various  decision‐
making logics and defense strategies 
Security 
Evaluation 
Module  
Security  assessment 
metrics 
Develop various metrics to evaluate the security 
related performance 
Security evaluation  Assess  effectiveness  for  different  defense strategies 
Platform 
Management 
Module 
Monitoring of tests  Ensure  a  safe  experimental  environment  for security tests 
Adding/removing 
functional modules  
Modularized  design,  flexible  to  add/remove 
scenarios for specific security issues 
Data  collection  and 
analysis  Log data of each test scenario 
A process to generate a cyber-physical attack scenario is shown in Figure 4.1. This process is 
developed based on an attack kill-chain in [165]. An attack can be launched in two stages. At 
the preparation stage, the attacker needs to get access to the communication channel, gathers 
required information, develops attack strategies and builds the attack path to deliver the attacks. 
Therefore, to generate an attack scenario, the Attack Scenario Generation Module should 
contain communication interface to capture network traffic and gain network information, 
design attack scripts to generate attack scenarios, and triggering schemes to trigger the attack 
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scenarios. During the attack execution stage, to capture and extract the attack profiles, the 
Attack Scenario Generation Module should be able to monitor and record the attack activities.  
Cyber 
intrusion
Gather 
information Deliver Exploit Execute
Physical 
damage
Stage 2: Attack Execution
Attack process
Stage 1: Attack Preparation
 Access to process data through 
network
 Required system information
 Cyber-physical interaction
 Data capturing and parsing
 Attack targets and 
goals
 Attack path
 Attack method  Communication interface Trigger conditions
 Attack action
 Data manipulation
 Hiding attack impact 
Defensive strategies
Protection, Prevention, Detection and Mitigation
Develop 
 
Figure 4.1 Process to generate an attack 
4.3.1.2 Requirements for Security Enhancement Module 
To foil an imminent cyber-physical attack, a cross-layered detection scheme and defense-in-
depth mitigation system is needed. This is carried out by a Security Enhancement Module. The 
module should be able to accommodate various strategies for security enhancement and 
flexible enough to change detection or defense strategies. Integration of cyber-physical 
security and control should be taken into account in the meanwhile. An example of a defense 
framework is shown in Figure 4.2 [67].  Once the attack detection scheme reveals an imminent 
attack, and attack mitigation scheme can be activated by the detection mechanism to respond 
to the detected threat and reduce its adverse effects.  
4.3.1.3 Requirements for Security Evaluation Module 
A comprehensive evaluation framework, together with a set of user-friendly tools is also 
needed for examining and evaluating the security and defense-readiness levels. This is 
performed by a Security Evaluation Module.  
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 Figure 4.2 Defense framework for a cyber-physical system 
Development of these techniques and tools may require data interaction and aggregation from 
different sources. Some in-depth security analysis and evaluation of the related systems is also 
needed within the platform. Furthermore, measurable security metrics also needs to be defined 
to assess the effectiveness of detection and mitigation schemes.  
4.3.2 Overall design of the proposed platform  
To meet the technical requirements, an overall framework of the proposed platform is proposed 
as in Figure 4.3. The locations of modules and data interactions are also illustrated in Figure 
4.3.  
The Attack Scenario Generation Module is connected with the cyber-physical system via an 
activation switch. The Security Enhancement Module is connected to the device 
communication channel and controllers to detect anomalies and execute attack mitigation 
strategies. The Security Evaluation Module gathers information from the process and other 
modules, and defines suitable security metrics for system security evaluation. The Platform 
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Management Module consists of an off-line part and an on-line part. Based on specific test 
requirements of a given scenarios, the off-line part determines suitable module compositions 
to form an effective test environment, while the on-line part oversees the entire operation of 
the platform during the test process to ensure safety and operational effectiveness.  
HMIOperator workstation Servers 
Controllers 
Sensors  Physical processes Actuators
Communication network
Communication network 
Supervisory 
system
Security 
Enhancement 
Module
Security Evaluation Module
Platform Management Module
Attack Scenario 
Generator
Activation Switch
Attack database
Attack Scenario Generation 
Module
 
Figure 4.3 Proposed architecture of a cyber-physical security platform 
4.4 Design of functional modules  
4.4.1 Attack Scenario Generation Module 
To identify potential vulnerabilities and to trace consequences of an attack, an Attack Scenario 
Generation Module is designed to mimic realistic cyber-physical attacks. The details of this 
module are shown in Figure 4.4. It contains four sub-blocks stored in the form of an Attack 
Library, i.e. attack scripts, targeted channel selection, attack duration setting, and attack trigger 
logics. Descriptions of these sub-blocks are further listed in Table 4.3.  
In addition, there is an activation switch within this module, which captures and transmits data 
between this module and the cyber-physical part of the system. A user can gain access to the 
targeted network channel via this activation switch either remotely through a network or by 
tapping into the network physically through pre-defined open ports.  
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Figure 4.4 Organization of an Attack Scenario Generation Module 
Table 4.3 Attack library in an Attack Scenario Generation Module 
Sub‐blocks  Description 
Attack scripts  Design details of the attack scenarios 
Target channel selection  Selection of access points for targeted communication channels
Attack duration setting  Record of the process for a staged attack scenario 
Attack trigger 
mechanism [133] 
Attack triggered when a pre‐determined input is detected 
Attack triggered when a particular trigger sequence is detected 
Attack triggered when the timer has ended its count sequence 
Attack triggered when a particular internal state is achieved 
This module is connected to the communication network between the field devices and the 
controller, and between the controller and the supervisory workstation. It is capable of 
interrupting or manipulating sensor readings and control flow through this switch. The 
implemented work includes gathering and parsing the communication data packets, designing 
attack scripts, building up attack paths, and setting up target communication channels, attack 
duration, and trigger conditions.  
This module is designed as an open-source attack library. Pre-programmed attack scripts and 
trigger logics are constructed within the attack library. This module is generic to generate 
various attack scenarios in different communication channels. All the sub-blocks within the 
module can be edited, added or removed based on the requirements in the tests. Attack scripts 
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in the module can be written and stored in the library, it can also be generated by the user of 
this platform. 
This module is implemented on a separate computer. It provides a wide attack surface 
including data attacks on sensors, actuators and controllers. It is an open source platform not 
only for the pre-programed attack scenarios, but also for other customized tests. 
Outcomes of the Attack Scenario Generation Module are as follows: 
 Vulnerability analysis of an existing architecture, cyber access, communication protocols, 
data flows between the control system and the physical process; 
 Vulnerability indicators for security enhancement; and 
 Index for evaluating attack impacts. 
4.4.2 Security Enhancement Module 
To mitigate adverse effects of an attack, detection and mitigation schemes are implemented in 
this module. The composition of the module is shown in Figure 4.5. This module contains 
several sub-functional blocks to support testing and validation of various detection and 
mitigation strategies. The detailed functional units are described in Table 4.4. 
There are three main functional parts in the Security Enhancement Module. The first one is for 
data collection and processing. The second one is for cross-layer attack detection. It supports 
process anomaly detection in physical layer, anomaly detection in cyber-physical layer, and 
network intrusion detection in the cyber layer. These detection results are forwarded to 
decision-making unit in the supervisory station. The third part is for attack mitigation. It 
consists of a decision-making unit and control algorithms. Defense-in-depth strategies that 
combine control and cyber-physical security can be implemented in these sub-blocks. 
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Figure 4.5 Function blocks of a Security Enhancement Module 
Table 4.4 Cross-layer design of a Security Enhancement Module 
Sub‐blocks  Description 
Data 
preparation 
Data collection  Collecting data from different layers and channels 
Data processing  Process and forward data to detection blocks 
Security boundary  Defining security boundaries and detection rules  
Detection  
Network intrusion 
detection 
Detecting intrusions of security boundary in cyber 
layers 
Anomaly detection in 
data transmission  Detecting anomalies in cyber‐physical layer 
Process monitoring  Detecting anomalies in physical layer 
Defense  
Decision‐making unit  Situation  awareness,  reconfiguration  of  operating conditions, and execution of control actions 
Attack mitigation 
algorithms  Executing attack‐resilient control algorithms 
Each functional unit in the Security Enhancement Module can vary in locations and with 
different implementation details. Detection schemes are deployed in multiple locations for 
cross-layer detection. Defense schemes are deployed in the supervisory system, it includes a 
decision-making unit and a control scheme. The decision-making unit is implemented within 
53 
 
 
 
the controllers using specific programming languages, while control algorithms are often 
implemented in a Distributed Control System (DCS) or a Programmable Logic Controller 
(PLC) and exchange data with the CPS through OPC or other communication channels.  
To provide flexibilities for security tests, all the sub-blocks are designed as an independent 
modular, which can be operated as a combined unit or individually. 
Outcomes of the Security Enhancement Module are potential anomalies and mitigation results 
provided by detection methods and mitigation strategies. 
4.4.3 Security Evaluation Module 
After attack scenarios are generated, and security enhancement strategies are conducted on the 
platform, one needs to (1) analyze system vulnerabilities associated with these attack scenarios, 
(2) assess their impacts, (3) analyze experimental results, and finally (4) evaluate the system 
security under specific mitigation strategies. 
These functions are realized in the Security Evaluation Module as outlined in Figure 4.6. There 
are three sub-blocks in this module, details are described in Table 4.5. Data sources of this 
module are from the Attack Scenario Generation Module, the Security Enhancement Module 
and the supervisory system.  All data are collected to evaluate the system security, and security 
metrics are calculated for security tests.  
In Security Evaluation Module, the data from different layers are extracted and sorted out into 
two data streams. One is the actual measurements and signal values that are transmitted through 
the communication channels; and the other is the attacked values that are observed by the 
supervisory system or those forwarded to the physical process. In this module, security metrics 
are used as evaluation rules, and system evaluation methods are implemented according to 
different objectives. 
Outcomes of the Security Evaluation Module include identified vulnerabilities, assessment of 
attack impacts, effectiveness of defense strategies, system security awareness and insights of 
security enhancement. 
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Figure 4.6 Function blocks of a Security Evaluation Module 
Table 4.5 Design consideration in a Security Evaluation Module 
Sub‐blocks  Description 
Data 
sources 
Database from Attack 
Scenario Generation 
Module 
Attack information and compromised data 
Database from Security 
Enhancement Module  Defense information and mitigated data 
Database from supervisory 
system 
Historian of process status from the 
communication network  
Calculation of metrics  Metrics to measure experimental results and performance validation  
System evaluation methods  Evaluation methods used 
Evaluation outcome  System security awareness  
4.4.4 Platform Management Module 
The Platform Management Module is used to manage other modules as well as the real-time 
monitoring of security and vulnerabilities within the platform during tests. Its interfaces with 
other modules are shown in Figure 4.7. Since the platform is designed in a modular fashion, 
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modules can be easily reconfigured, deployed and initialized according to the needs of specific 
security tests. 
This module can be implemented in a separate computer to manage all the functional modules 
and monitor events and scenarios if necessary. 
 Security 
Enhancement 
Module
Platform management
Attack Scenario 
Generation Module
Security Evaluation 
Module
System monitoring
Gateway  
Figure 4.7 Function blocks of a Platform Management Module 
4.5 Construction of a prototype platform  
A well designed cyber-physical test platform should cover two aspects: (1) an experimental 
environment of the cyber-physical system, and (2) required functionalities for security tests.  
To demonstrate the inner workings of the proposed platform, a prototype platform is 
constructed by integrating all the modules into an experimental environment in Figure 4.3. The 
environment is designed to represent key features of a cyber-physical system. The 
implementation details for each functional module are presented next.  
4.5.1 Composition of a cyber-physical environment 
Construction of the experimental environment can be divided into three main layers: (1) 
industrial control facilities and software in the cyber layer, (2) communication networks in the 
cyber-physical layer, and (3) a physical system including sensors and actuators in the physical 
layer. 
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Multiple sources for data collection and multiple access points for security tests are needed in 
this environment. As such, the functional modules can be connected to the cyber-physical 
environment to perform security tests. 
4.5.2 Construction of a specific platform 
Once the prototype platform is constructed, it is then connected to a cyber-physical 
environment known as the nuclear power control test facility (NPCTF). The constructed 
security platform on NPCTF is shown in Figure 4.8.  
Details for each functional module are as follows. Tools used for each model is listed in the 
tables below, implementation details are described in the following sections. Considering the 
security of the designed platform and security of NPCTF,  the developed code is not publicized, 
all the codes are stored in and managed by UWO CIE Lab. The codes package written for this 
dissertation are listed in Appendix A, demo videos for the platform and tests are listed in 
Appendix B. 
4.5.2.1 Implementation of the Attack Scenario Generation Module 
The Attack Scenario Generation Module is constructed on a separate attack computer under 
Kali Linux environment, procedures to generate an attack scenario is illustrated in Figure 4.9. 
Each sub-block in Figure 4.4 is implemented with details given in Table 4.6. In order to 
generate an attack scenario based on Figure 4.1, a user needs to get access to the 
communication network in NPCTF first. An activation switch is implemented as the 
communication interface between the Attack Scenario Generation Module and the 
communication network in NPCTF. The user can capture and gather the transmitted data 
packets through this activation switch. In order to read and inject attack scenarios, 
communication protocols are parsed, and attack scripts are compiled in Python language. 
Currently, three types of cyber-physical attack scripts are developed in this module, i.e. 
deception attack, false-data injection attack and replay attack. Since this module is an open-
source platform, users can customize it and generate other cyber-physical attack scenarios as 
situations require. 
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Figure 4.8 Composition of the prototype security platform 
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There are three communication channels that can be selected in the Attack Scenario Generation 
Module: (1) Channel 1 connects the network between the sensors to the controllers, (2) 
Channel 2 connects the network between the controller and the actuators, and (3) Channel 3 
connects the network between the controllers and the supervisory station. These channels 
represent the attack entry points A1, A2 and A3 in Figure 3.1, respectively. 
Attacks can be generated and launched from a separate attack computer. HMIs and PLCs are 
on two different subnets and connected through an Ethernet using TCP/IP. Bi-direction 
communication channels have been constructed by reversing the control protocols, transmitted 
data packet can be extracted through the activation switch. In this implementation, three types 
of cyber-physical attack scenarios are developed: deception attack, false-data injection attack 
and replay attack. Two trigger logics are also designed in the attack library. 
The attack duration setting block and the attack trigger block are implemented using Visual 
basic language, which can generate the attack duration setting and trigger the attack scenarios. 
Preparation phase Design phase Execution phase
Attack points
Attack action
Attack 
algorithms
Trigger logics
Attack goal
(Intended impact)
Attack path 
(start to end)
Type of attack
Attack channel 
setting
Attack timing
Activation 
switch
Database
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Figure 4.9 Procedures to generate an attack scenario 
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Table 4.6 Implementation of an Attack Scenario Generation Module 
Sub‐blocks  Functions  Tools  
Attack scripts 
Capture transmission 
data packet  Wireshark  
Parse communication 
protocols and construct 
attack scenarios 
Python language 
Target channel 
selection 
Attack data 
transmission  Industrial activation switch  
Build graphical user 
interface (GUI) for 
channel selection 
Visual Basic 
Attack duration 
setting 
Build GUI for attack 
duration setting  Visual Basic 
Attack trigger 
schemes 
Build GUI for selection 
of trigger logics  Visual Basic 
4.5.2.2 Implementation of the Security Enhancement Module 
To validate the detection and defense schemes, the detection and defense function block is 
implemented on the NPCTF through an OPC server, as shown in Figure 4.10. Data 
transmission and algorithms for detection and defense function unit are detailed in Table 4.7. 
Different detection methods in different layers are implemented in the detection sub-blocks. 
Network intrusion detection unit and anomaly detection for cyber-physical interactions are 
deployed in the supervisory station using Snort. The anomaly detection unit for process data is 
implemented in a separate workstation. It collects the process data online through an OPC 
server in the supervisory station and performs the detection algorithms real-time in MATLAB. 
When there is an alarm, the detection unit will send the detected anomaly to the supervisory 
station. 
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Figure 4.10  Implementation of a Security Enhancement Module on NPCTF  
Table 4.7 Construction of a Security Enhancement Module 
Sub-blocks Functions Tools 
Data 
preparation 
Physical process 
data collection  Collect process data 
Freelance OPC 
2000 
Network data 
collection Capture transmitted data packets Wireshark 
Data processing Analyze and process datasets  BASE 
Security boundary Define security metrics and safety thresholds as detection rules Snort 
Detection  
Network intrusion 
detection 
Scan port  
Detect network intrusions 
Nmap  
Snort 
Anomaly 
detection 
Monitor cyber-physical interactions 
Construct detection methods 
Snort 
MATLAB  
Process data 
anomaly detection Monitor process data DigiVis 
Defense  
Decision-making 
unit Configuration in Supervisory station Control Builder F
Attack mitigation 
algorithms Compute the control parameters 
MATLAB 
Control Builder F
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Defense schemes are implemented in the supervisory station. Decision-making logics and 
controller structures are reconfigured through ABB Control Builder F and are loaded to PLC. 
Control algorithms are implemented in MATLAB to calculate the parameters of the 
reconfigured controller. The calculated parameters are sent back to PLC through OPC server. 
4.5.2.3 Implementation of the Security Evaluation Module 
During the operation, the status of the platform needs to be logged for further analysis and 
evaluation. The logged dataset contains the physical properties related to the process, as well 
as the network traffic including those in the midst of attacks. Security metrics are based on a 
specific area and concerns, and evaluation methods are implemented in the supervisory station 
and connected to NPCTF through an OPC server. 
Implementation procedures for the Security Evaluation Module is shown in Figure 4.11. It 
resides on the supervisory station.  
In the Security Evaluation Module, data from different layers are extracted and sorted into two 
streams. One is for control commands and parameters that compromise the network protocols; 
and the other is for the current state of the observed process variables [154].  
In this chapter, NPCTF is served as a target physical process to demonstrate how the proposed 
design methods can be used to construct a specific security assessment platform. The proposed 
modular design is not restricted to only NPCTF, it can also be applied to other cyber-physical 
systems. It provides guidelines and methods to build up a cyber-physical security assessment 
platform. 
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Figure 4.11 Implementation procedures for a Security Evaluation Module 
4.6 Case Studies 
To study the features and effectiveness of the proposed platform, case studies including various 
cyber-physical attack scenarios, detection methods and mitigation strategies are performed on 
NPCTF using the platform, as shown in Figure 4.8. The selected system to mount attacks is 
the heater control loop of NPCTF, as shown in Figure 4.12.  
In the heater control loop, the outlet temperature 2T  is regulated by the heater current C2 
through a proportional (P) controller. When the temperature 2T  is below the setpoint value, the 
controller (AC700F) will send out a command to increase the heater current. An anomaly 
detection scheme is designed according to the minimum (LL=15℃) and maximum (HH=37℃) 
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thresholds defined by the system safety specifications. If the measured temperature 2T  exceeds 
37℃, the alarm will be triggered to cut off the current supply and subsequently trip the system 
shut down.  
C2'
C2 
 T2 
 T2' 
Device communication network
Sensor Heater Actuators 
Attack Scenario 
Generation Module
Activation switch Controller (AC700F)
Control communication network
Supervisory station
 
Figure 4.12 Cyber-physical attacks on the heater control loop 
The attack goal is to drive T2 beyond its safety limit without being detected. 
4.6.1 Experiment design 
The experiment consists of three cases.  
Case #1 is to validate the functionality of the Attack Scenario Generation Module. System 
vulnerabilities are explored through six attack scenarios. In order to reflect different attack 
surfaces and scenarios supported by the Attack Scenario Generation Module, three different 
attack scenarios are launched on sensor measurement 2T , and three different attack scenarios 
are launched on the control signals to actuator C2. The implemented attack scenarios are 
described in Table 4.8.  
Case #2 is to validate the functionality of the Security Enhancement Module and test various 
cross-layered detection methods. There are four detection methods, D1-D4, that are deployed 
to detect the anomalies induced by various attack scenarios on NPCTF, as listed in Table 4.9. 
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Case #3 is to evaluate the performance of attack mitigation strategies. Different mitigation 
methods M1-M3, are development and tested. Design methods are listed in Table 4.9.  
Table 4.8 Attack scenarios launched on the platform 
Attack  entry 
point  
Attack 
scenario  Attack type  Attack description 
Sensor 
measurement 
2T   
SA1  False‐data injection attack Modify  2 2( ) ( ) 0.05T t T t t 
  
SA2  Replay attack  Record  and  replay  historical  data  when injecting attacks 
SA3  DoS Attack  Blocking sensor measurements for 20s 
Control 
commands  to 
actuator C2 
AA1  False‐data injection attack Inject a deviation of 10% to C2 
AA2  Replay attack  Record  and  replay  historical  data  when injecting attacks 
AA3  DoS Attack  Blocking control commands to actuator for 10s 
Table 4.9 Security enhancement methods used in Case #2 
Security enhancements  Methods   Techniques 
Detection methods  
D1  Safety threshold (HH) 
D2  Rule‐based network intrusion detection 
D3  CUSUM method: τ=0.5, b=1 
D4  Physical watermarking method [37] 
Mitigation methods  
M1  P controller 
M2  Decision‐making unit 
M3  A PI controller with a state estimator 
Mitigation methods consist of a decision-making unit M2 and a resilient control system M3. 
When M2 receives anomaly alarms generated from detection methods, it will decide how to 
respond to the attacks for the given situation.  
Evaluation work are constructed based on these three case studies. Security evaluation metrics 
together with evaluation methods EV1-EV3 are defined in Table 4.10.  
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Outline of the experimental designs are presented in Table 4.11.  
Table 4.10 Definition of security metrics 
Evaluation   Concerns   Security metrics  Description 
Case #1: EV1 
Effectiveness of the 
Attack Scenario 
Generation Module
Test effectiveness  Are correct attack scenarios generated? 
Exploring 
vulnerabilities 
Impact of attacks 
Attack successful 
criteria 
Attack duration 
Achieve attack goal before 
being detected 
Start time and end time 
Attack impacts  System dynamics and consequences 
Case #2: EV2 
Evaluating 
performance of 
detection methods
Detection 
effectiveness   If attack is detected timely? 
Detection speed 
Time to detect an attack 
measured from the moment 
the attack starts 
Case #3: EV3 
Evaluating 
performance of 
mitigation methods
Mitigation 
effectiveness  If attacks are mitigated? 
Response to attacks  System dynamics 
Table 4.11 Case studies on the platform 
Security tests  Case #1  Case #2  Case #3 
Implemented attacks  SA1, SA2, SA3  SA1, SA2, SA3  SA1, SA2 AA1, AA2, AA3  AA1, AA2, AA3 
Detection methods  D1 
D2 
D2+D3+D4 D3 
D4 
Mitigation methods  M1: P Controller   M1: P Controller   M2+M3 
Evaluation Methods   EV1  EV2  EV3 
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4.6.2 Experimental results 
4.6.2.1 Case #1: Exploring system vulnerabilities 
In this case study, six attack scenarios have been implemented to investigate system 
vulnerabilities. The experimental results of three attacks on sensor measurements (SA1, SA2, 
SA3) are shown in Figure 4.13. 
In SA1, the method of the attack is to manipulate the sensor data from 2T by adding a slowly 
varying negative offset Δ 2T = -0.05t and then sending it to PLC. The attack is set to be triggered 
at a predefined time tstart=25s.  As shown in Figure 4.13(a), when the actual signal 2T exceeds 
its safety limit of 37℃ at 164s, the tampered 2T  (Attacked signal) sent to the PLC is only 
appeared to be 24℃, the anomaly detection scheme is fooled.  
In SA2, a replay attack is implemented during the transmission of the sensor measurement, the 
actual 2T is replaced by a recorded historical data. When SA2 begins at time t=25s, the heater 
is running at its setpoint 2T =30℃.  The recorded data is sent to the controller, the deviation 
between the fake 2T and the setpoint of 2T leads to an increase of  actual 2T . As shown in Figure 
4.13(b), the replay attack continues being undetected until the actual 2T  is out of its safety limit 
of 37℃.  
In SA3, the data packet is blocked for 20s when transmitted from the sensor to the controller. 
The last received data of 2T is used during the communication interruption. It can be observed 
in Figure 4.13(c)that the DoS attack does not have a major impact if the system is at a steady 
state when the attack is launched. 
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Figure 4.13 Attack scenarios on the temperature sensor data 
Attacks on the actuator data (AA1, AA2, AA3) are implemented and the results are 
demonstrated in Figure 4.14. It can be observed that attacks have compromised the control 
signals and sent tampered control commands to the actuators (Left part in Figure 4.14). The 
(c) DoS attack on sensor (SA3) 
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tampered control commands then drive the physical process out of the safety limit (Right part 
in Figure 4.14).  
This case study has validated that the Attack Scenario Generation Module can generate various 
cyber-physical attacks on different attack surfaces. Attack impact and system vulnerabilities 
can be extracted and analyzed from the generated attack scenarios.  
 
Figure 4.14 Attack scenarios on the heater actuator 
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4.6.2.2 Case #2: Developing and testing multi-layer detection methods 
In this case, different detection methods have been configured to reveal the anomalies from 
cyber-physical attacks. Based on the defined security metrics for Case #2, the results of the 
implemented detection methods are summarized in Table 4.12. 
The detection results have shown that various detection methods can be tested and evaluated 
on this platform. Different detection methods can be compared or integrated with respect to 
specific vulnerabilities. For example, the safety threshold method (D1) can only detect attacks 
that break system safety limit. Rule-based methods are effective for attacks that do not conform 
to the rules, but it does not work for stealthy attacks. CUSUM method (D3) provides fast 
detection speed, and physical watermarking method (D4) is more effective in detecting replay 
attacks. Furthermore, this platform can also be used to test the comprehensive performance of 
an integrated detection scheme that includes various different detection methods.  
Table 4.12 Results of detection methods on the platform 
Attack 
scenario 
Attack 
start 
time 
Detection effectiveness  Detection speed 
D1  D2  D3  D4  D1  D2  D3  D4
SA1  t=25s  Undetected   Undetected  Detected   Detected  ‐‐  ‐‐  6s  13s
SA2  t=30s  Undetected   Undetected  Detected   Detected  ‐‐  ‐‐  4s  3s 
SA3  t=30s  Undetected   Detected   Undetected  Detected  ‐‐  2s  ‐‐  8s 
AA1  t=35s  Detected   Detected   Detected   Detected  97s  12s  3s  8s 
AA2  t=30s  Undetected   Undetected  Detected   Detected  ‐‐  ‐‐   6s  6s 
AA3  t=60s  Undetected   Detected   Detected   Detected  ‐‐  3s  10s  10s
4.6.2.3 Case #3: Evaluating the performance of mitigation strategies 
In order to mitigate the effects of attacks, a multi-layer attack-resilient control system is 
implemented within the Security Enhancement Module. In this case, a false-data injection 
attack (SA1) and a replay attack (SA2) are implemented on the system, respectively. Detection 
methods D2, D3 and D4 work together to detect anomalies, decision-making logic M2 is used 
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to determine which controller should be switched. It is designed that the original P controller 
is operating when there is no attack detected. When an anomaly alarm is triggered, the 
controller M3 will be switched to reduce the impacts of attacks. The experimental results are 
shown in Figure 4.15. 
 
Figure 4.15 Attack mitigation against attacks 
The results have shown that the control system design incorporates the cyber-physical security. 
When the anomaly is detected, the decision-making logic will respond to these anomalies and 
select the corresponding control algorithm. When the false-data attack deviates the 
measurement of 2T , CUSUM method (D3) detects the deviation and trigger an attack alarm. 
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The corresponding controller will respond and compensate the deviation to maintain the 
system variables within the normal operating range. Hence, the effect of the deviation caused 
by the attack is neutralized, and the measurement of 2T will return to its desired value. When 
the replay attack hides the actual sensor measurement 2T by a recorded data, physical 
watermarking detection (D4) reveals the anomaly. The decision-making unit will use the 
setpoint of 2T to substitute 2T , and the controller will bring the heater temperature back to its 
setpoint.  
Implementation of the presented security platform demonstrates that the proposed design 
method for a security platform can be easily applied to a specific cyber-physical environment. 
The case studies have shown that the proposed platform is effective to perform various security 
tests. The modularized design makes the security tests flexible. The platform provides a cross-
layer Security Enhancement Module, which could take security in cyber and cyber-physical 
layer into consideration during controller design.  
4.7 Conclusions  
This chapter provides a design guideline for an experimental security platform, and proposes 
a modular approach to design and implement such a platform for security study of cyber-
physical systems. The developed platform consists of three functional modules: (1) Attack 
Scenario Generation Module, (2) Security Enhancement Module, and (3) Security Evaluation 
Module. The first module can be used to mimic attack scenarios to expose potential system 
vulnerabilities. The second module supports various strategies to detect, prevent, and mitigate 
potential attacks. Finally, the third module creates a multi-layer systematic environment to 
analyze and evaluate the identified security issues. The platform also consists of a Platform 
Management Module to manage the three functional modules and monitor the test in process.  
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed systems and techniques, a specific prototype 
platform has been designed and implemented by using a physical component based dynamic 
system simulator, known as nuclear process control test facility (NPCTF). Case studies have 
been carried out on this platform to demonstrate the features and feasibilities of the proposed 
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platform. Different security scenarios have been implemented and their effects have been 
evaluated to study the effectiveness of the three functional modules. Experimental results have 
validated this modular design approach and demonstrated that the platform can be an effective 
tool to analyze vulnerabilities, and to evaluate the effectiveness of different security enhanced 
strategies for cyber-physical systems. Test results can also provide insights to security 
strengthening strategies. 
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Chapter 5  
5 Analysis and Formulation of Insider Attacks through Data 
Tampering 
5.1 Introduction 
To ensure that insider attacks do not cause major disruptions to cyber-physical systems, it is 
critical to understand how the system is impacted by an attacker and how to detect these attacks. 
This chapter focuses on analysis and modeling of insider attacks through data tampering, to be 
more precise, attacks that may try to disable or tamper with sensor measurements or control 
signals during transmission process. 
In this chapter, a method to analyze and characterize the features of insider attacks is proposed. 
Firstly, the model of a cyber-physical system subject to insider attacks is analyzed in the 
framework of a cyber-physical system. Then, an attack pattern is captured in terms of attack 
goals, resources, constraints, modes, as well as potential attack paths. Next, conditions to 
achieve stealthy attacks are analyzed. Attack process is analyzed based on these attributes in 
the attack pattern. potential impacts of such attacks on the system behavior are analyzed using 
an attack tree. Finally, case studies are carried out to demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed 
work.  
5.2 System analysis 
5.2.1 Cyber-physical systems  
A cyber-physical control system can be conceptually divided into four main parts as shown in 
Figure 5.1: a physical process, a communication network, a controller, sensors and actuators. 
An anomaly detection scheme can also be introduced to such a system. 
In the control loop, the sensor measurements and control commands are transmitted through a 
cyber-enabled communication network. The sensor and actuator signals on the physical side 
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can be represented by ( ) py k R and ( ) mu k R , respectively. The sensor data and the control 
commands at the cyber side are denoted as ( ) py k R and ( ) mu k R , respectively.  
Anomaly detection scheme uses the observed sensor data ( )y k  and the control commands ( )u k
in the cyber side to detect any anomalies based on the normal operations [156]. 
The nominal system behavior under normal operations can be defined as ( ) ( )u k u k and 
( ) ( )y k y k  .  
 
Figure 5.1 A cyber-physical system with an anomaly detection scheme 
5.2.1.1 Physical process model 
Assume that the model of the physical process can be represented as: 
( 1) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x k Ax k Bu k
y k Cx k
  

                                         (5.1) 
where n( )x k R  are the system state variables, ( ) mu k R  is the control command applied to 
the process, ( ) py k R  is the output of the system, A, B, and C are the system matrices of 
Anomaly detection scheme
Physical process 
Data tampering attacks 
Communication Network
Sensors Actuators 
𝒖෥ሺ𝒌ሻ 
𝒚෥ሺ𝒌ሻ 
𝒚ሺ𝒌ሻ 
𝒖ሺ𝒌ሻ 
Controller 
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appropriate dimensions, and  0,1, ,k N   denotes the discrete-time index, taking values 
from the time horizon [0, N]. 
From Equation (5.1), the output of the system can also be derived as: 
( 1) ( 1)
( ) ( )
y k Cx k
CAx k CBu k
  
 
                                           (5.2) 
From a security point of view, Equation (5.2) links potential anomalies in the control 
commands ( )u k  to the observation of ( 1)y k  . Therefore, it is possible to detect anomalies 
from the sensor measurements through proper data processing. 
5.2.1.2 Anomaly detection scheme 
An anomaly detection scheme is used to monitor the system behavior and detect possible 
anomalies. Sensor data ( )y k  and control signals ( )u k  are collected in an anomaly detection 
scheme.  
Given sensor data ( )y k  and control signals ( )u k  are known at time k, the system state at time 
(k+1) can be estimated as 
1ˆ ˆ( 1) ( ( ), ( ), ( 1))x k L x k u k y k                                            (5.3) 
where 1(.)L is a state estimator of the system. 
The sensor output of the system at time (k+1) can be predicted based on model of the physical 
process. 
ˆ ˆ( 1) ( ) ( )y k CAx k CBu k                                                   (5.4) 
If the system has been attacked, the attack detection scheme will compare the compromised 
data ( )y k  with the estimated output ˆ( )y k . The difference is known as a  residual and then can 
be used to detect existing anomalies.  
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The residual is defined as: 
ˆ( ) : ( ) ( )r k y k y k                                                  (5.5) 
The detection scheme is defined as: 
( ( ))Z f r k                                                         (5.6) 
where (.)f is a detection algorithm. 
Attack detection decision rule can be defined by testing the following hypothesis: 
0
1
  (No Attack)    
  (Under Attack)
H Z
Detection
H Z


                                      (5.7) 
where 0   is a pre-selected detection threshold. If the deviation exceeds the detection 
threshold, 1H  is accepted and the detection scheme will arise an anomaly alarm, otherwise 
under the hypothesis 0H , it means no anomaly has been detected. 
5.2.2 Cyber-physical systems under insider attacks 
 
Let an insider attack ( )a k  represent the attack at time k, the system input and output under this 
attack can now be characterized as ( )y k  or ( )u k . The system model now becomes: 
( 1) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x k Ax k Bu k
y k Cx k
  

                                            (5.8) 
 If the attacks are only on control commands sent to the actuators, then ( ) ( )u k u k , 
( ) ( )y k y k . The attack offset ( )ua k   becomes:  
( ) ( ) ( )ua k u k u k                                                               (5.9) 
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If the attacks are only on sensor measurements sent to the controllers, ( ) ( )u k u k , 
( ) ( )y k y k . The attack offset ( )ya k   becomes  
( ) ( ) ( )ya k y k y k                                                               (5.10) 
If the attacks are both on control commands sent to actuators and sensor measurements, 
( ) ( )u k u k , ( ) ( )y k y k . The attack offset becomes a vector ( )ka   as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
u
y
a k u k u k
k
a k y k y k
         

a                                                 (5.11) 
5.3 Formulation of insider attacks 
In this section, a general analytical formulation of insider attacks is presented and described 
firstly, and then three specific attack scenarios are formulated case by case. 
5.3.1 Formulation of an attack pattern 
An attack pattern describes attack features associated with performing a particular type of 
attack [157]. Attack patterns represent a set of undesirable and unexpected operational 
behaviors. In this section, an attack pattern is defined as a representation used to model 
different insider attack scenarios. Based on the identified vulnerabilities in Chapter 3, each 
attack pattern contains six attributes, based on system vulnerabilities, which is defined as a 
tuple in Definition 5.1. 
Definition 5.1 (Insider attack pattern): An insider attack pattern AP is defined as a tuple 
with six attributes. 
 , , , , ,s s sAP G R C M P I                                                   (5.12) 
where  sG  is the attack goal. 
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sR  represents the accessible disruption resources related to the attack, which may affect the 
integrity of the system components. 
sC represents the conditions used to keep the insider attack stealthy. 
M  is the attack scenario, which the attacker may take to achieve the goals. 
P  represents the entry points, attack steps and attack paths for a successful attack. 
I represents attack impacts on the system. 
The following sub-sections contain detailed descriptions for the above six attributes in an 
insider attack pattern. 
5.3.1.1 Attack goals  
The attack goals might be the penetration process, or a set of exploitation of system 
vulnerabilities, or impacts on the behaviors of the systems. In this dissertation, the attack goal 
is to drive safety-critical variables out of their safety boundary and cause dangerous impacts 
in physical process while keeping stealthy. 
5.3.1.2 Attack resources  
Attack resources include knowledge of system model, interactions among various sub-systems, 
and those resources that the attacker may possess relating to targeted components in the system. 
Attackers can compromise CPS information with specific objectives. It is assumed herein that 
the adversary: (1) has knowledge of the system dynamics, (2) the information of the control 
and/ or anomaly detection strategies; and (3) aims to conduct a malicious action that will 
compromise system if not being detected in time.  
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5.3.1.3 Stealthy conditions  
Stealth conditions can be viewed as constraints from an attacker point of view. For the linear 
system described in Equation (5.1), the attack is stealthy if there is no anomaly alarm detected 
by the anomaly detection scheme during an attack.  
In this dissertation, it is assumed that the attack is launched without violating the constraints 
of stealthy conditions. Stealthy conditions will further be analyzed in detail in Section 5.4.1. 
5.3.1.4 Attack methods  
Attack methods refer to the ways that an adversary may take to carry out an attack. Formulation 
Three insider attack methods have been considered in this chapter: deception attack, false-data 
injection attack, and replay attack. These attack methods have been formulated in Section 5.3.2. 
5.3.1.5 Attack paths and attack steps  
Attack paths and steps describe how an attack is to be carried out to achieve its intended goals. 
In this chapter, a comprehensive attack tree that integrates attack scenarios and vulnerabilities 
of the system is developed in Section 5.4.2 to plan out the possible attack paths and identify 
the corresponding attack steps from the cyber domain to the physical processes.  
5.3.1.6 Attack impacts  
Attack impacts are analyzed in an attack tree in Section 5.4.2 as well.  
5.3.2 Formulation of insider attacks  
In order to characterize the features of insider attacks from a system point of view, this section 
discusses two types of insider attack strategies and their related mathematical models. The first 
is a deception attack and a false-data injection attack. The objective is to mislead the anomaly 
detection mechanism and inject false data stealthily. The second is a replay attack, which hides 
its malicious attack action by replaying a healthy historical data sequence in the system. 
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5.3.2.1 Deception attack 
During a deception attack, sensor data ( )y k  and control signals ( )u k  are tampered to ( )u k and 
( )y k , respectively.  
Considering the attacker’s access to the communication channels in cyber layers, a deception 
attacks can be modeled as: 
   
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
u
u
y
y
u y
u y
u k u k a k
y k y k a k
a k a k a k
  
  
    

                                                      (5.13) 
where ( )ua k  and ( )ya k  represent the attack signals to the corresponding sensor and control 
channels,  0,1u  and  0,1y  are the binary index matrix that indicate the connectivity 
status between the attack signals and the corresponding communication channels.  
5.3.2.2 False-data injection attack 
A false-data injection attack can manipulate the state estimator and insert certain signals into 
an unknown subset of sensors and actuators without being detected. A false-data injection 
attack on control signals can be modeled as: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
u
u
u
u
u k u k a k
a k a k
  
 
                                                    (5.14)  
where ( )u ua k is the attack signal injected by the insider attacker to the control channel; and 
 0,1u  represents the binary incidence matrix mapping the data corruption to the respective 
data channels. 
A false-data injection attack on a subset of sensor nodes can be modeled as: 
     ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
y
y
y
y
y k y k a k
a k a k
  
 
                                               (5.15) 
where ( )y ya k  is the tampered signal sent by the inside attacker to the sensor measurement 
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channel; and  0,1y   is a binary index matrix that indicate the connectivity status between 
the attack signals and the corresponding communication channels.  
5.3.2.3 Replay attack 
In replay attacks, the adversary first records a sequence of historical data, then replays the 
recorded data to hide his or her malicious actions. A diagram of this replay attack is described 
in Figure 5.2. Replay attack mode can be described in two steps: 
Actual data
Step I: 
Record data
0k rk
Co
ntr
oll
er 
inp
ut
Timesk fk
Step II: 
Replay data
Replayed data
 
Figure 5.2 Diagram of a replay attack 
Let ( )yI k  be the set of sensor data to the controller at time k, 0( , )rI k k represents a set of sensor 
data from 0k  to rk . 
Step I: The attacker records a sequence of sensor measurements  0( , )rI k k  from 0k  to rk , there 
is no action at this stage. 
Step I: 
( ) 0
( )( ) ( )
u
y
a k
u k
I k
y k
       
                                              (5.16) 
where 0 rk k k   and 0(0, )I k  is an empty set before time 0k  . 
Step II: Starting at time 1s rk k  , the attacker modifies the sensor signals to the controllers 
with the recorded historical data, and inject attacks to control commands.  
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Step II: 
( )( ) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( )
u
u
y
k T
a k
a k
y k y k
I k I k T

          
                                  (5.17) 
where 0 0,  s s s rT k k k k k k k      . 
Meanwhile, starting at time sk , the attacker might inject a control input ( )u ub k  to achieve 
their malicious objective, all measurement data during the attack interval may not be available 
to the anomaly detection scheme, which helps the attacker to keep stealthy by designing the 
attack ( )u ua k  to achieve the malicious goal.  
Given the attack pattern and the corresponding attack methods from different insider attacks, 
it is necessary to analyze the stealthy conditions and impacts on the CPS, and to capture their 
features from a control and system point of view. 
5.4 Analysis of insider attacks 
There are two aspects that need to be considered from a control system point of view when 
analyzing the impact of an insider attack. One is its stealthy conditions, which can show limit 
of the attack, and provide clues for improving the resilience of the control system. Another is 
its impact on the system, which includes system performance degradation under insider attacks 
as well as the corresponding vulnerabilities related to the attack. 
5.4.1 Analysis of stealthy conditions 
5.4.1.1 Stealthy condition with attack process 
To analyze the stealthy conditions of the attack, attack processes need to be analyzed firstly. 
An attack can be divided into several stages from having access to the entry points to achieving 
the attack goals. The process can be summarized in Figure 5.3. 
Along with the attack process, stealthy attacks can be composed of three preceding phases: (1) 
stealthiness at communication, (2) stealthiness at execution, (3) stealthiness at propagation 
[158].  
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Figure 5.3 Stealthiness in an attack process 
For the insider attacks considered in this dissertation, the stealthy condition in the Phase 1 is 
to get access to the targeted communication channel and compromise the data while not being 
detected by the network intrusion detection schemes and firewalls. In the Phase 2, the attacker 
delivers the attack (tampering data) from the cyber space to the system. The stealthy condition 
for this phase is that the attack cannot trigger any alarms before the attack goal is achieved. 
The last phase of stealthiness means that the attack has achieved the attack goal successfully 
before being detected. 
5.4.1.2  Stealthy conditions 
Given an adversary has the access to the system and knowledge of the network and can inject 
false sensor readings and manipulate the state variables. Under this assumption, the adversary 
has already achieved stealthiness in the phases of communication and attack execution. It is 
necessary to analyze the stealthiness of the attack propagation phase. 
There are two types of stealthy conditions at the propagation stage: (1) spatial stealthy 
conditions and (2) temporal stealthy conditions.  
One simple cyber-physical attack is to add a nonzero attack vector ( )a k   to the original sensor 
measurements vector ( )y k . The observed sensor measurement ( )y k  can be manipulated as
( ) ( ) ( )y k y k a k  . If the anomaly detection scheme in the system is based on the norm of the 
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residual, the tampered measurements ( )y k  would be indistinguishable from the nominal 
values ( )y k . As a result, the attack would be undetectable.  
For both the deception attack and false-data injection attack, an attack will only be detected 
when the residual of the anomaly alarm system exceeds the detection threshold. Therefore, 
stealthiness of the attacks is dependent of the detection schemes employed in the system.  
5.4.1.2.1 Spatial stealthy attack 
A spatial stealthy attack usually takes advantage the coupling relationship among the physical 
process variables to bypass the anomaly detection schemes.  
Let ˆ ˆ( ) ( ( ) )ay k C x k   be the output estimation when an attack is under way,  is the error of 
the state estimation caused by the attack. 
The residual under attacks can be calculated as 
  
ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ( ) )
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ( ) )
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ( ) )
( ) ( ( ) )
a ar k y k y k
y k a k C x k
y k Cx k a k C
y k y k a k C
r k a k C




 
   
   
   
  

                                       (5.18) 
When the attack is designed as ( )a k C , ( ) ( )ar k r k , the residual under the attack ( )ar k  is 
the same as the residual ( )r k  under a normal operation. This means that the attack is 
camouflaged in the system measurements. The attack will not cause any deviations in the 
system estimation and therefore will not be detected by the anomaly detection scheme.  
5.4.1.2.2 Temporal stealthy attack 
A temporal stealthy attack usually hides its deviation to make the observed output adopts to 
the dynamics of the system [159]. Stuxnet replay attack is an example of such an attack. 
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Given that the attacker has the knowledge of the model, the attacker can simulate the system 
output based on this model, and then use the simulated output to deceive the detection scheme. 
Since the simulated output and sending input satisfy the control law, the residual will always 
be zero. Consequently, arbitrary data can be injected into the system without affecting residuals. 
A temporal stealthy attack can be described as 
( 1) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
( ) ( ) ( )
u
y
x k Ax k B u k a k
y k Cx k a k
   
                                            (5.19)                        
where ( )ya k is given by 
 ( 1) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
a a
y a
x k Ax k Bu k
a k Cx k
  
                                              (5.20) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )a uu k u k a k  .  
5.4.2 Impact analysis of insider attacks 
5.4.2.1 Analysis by attack trees 
The impact of an insider attack on the system can been analyzed using attack trees. Details 
about attack trees has been discussed in Chapter 3.  
Recall that vulnerability vector of each path can be expressed as: 
 ( ( )) (0), (1), ,V P i v v G                                        (5.21) 
In order to identify the vulnerabilities, all the nodes and variables need to be analyzed along 
each attack path. 
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5.4.2.2 Similarities and differences among attack patterns 
The purpose to analyze the features of attacks is to analytically identify system vulnerabilities 
relating to the attacks from a system and control perspective. Based on the identified 
vulnerabilities, an effective defensive strategy can be developed.  
In this section, similarities and differences of the above attack methods are summarized as an 
input for the design of subsequent attack defensive schemes. The above two attack methods 
have the same goals, namely to disrupt the integrity of the system without being detected. All 
of them are constrained by the safe operating boundaries. They all require knowledge of the 
system in terms of models, interactions, and inside attackers’ resources for the targeted system. 
Although their attack methods are different, their final goals are the same. 
In an attack tree, some vulnerabilities are used in different attack paths. These vulnerabilities 
can be identified and used to design anomaly detection schemes. Furthermore, common attack 
paths and attack steps can be established by using the collected similarities of different attack 
scenarios.  
5.5 Case studies 
5.5.1 Experimental setup 
To demonstrate the proposed methodology, case studies are conducted on the security platform 
developed in Chapter 4. In this section, NPCTF architecture is analyzed first to identify system 
vulnerabilities. Then, two stealthy attack scenarios are analyzed. One is to illustrate the impact 
of a temporal stealthy false-data injection attack on sensors. The other is to illustrate the impact 
of a spatial replay attack on sensors and actuators.  
5.5.1.1 System model 
The selected system is the heater control loop on NPCTF, as shown in Figure 4.13. In the 
heater control loop, the safety limit of 2T is set at 37℃, the residual magnitude is set to be 
0.5℃, the change rate is less than 0.05℃/s. 
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A model of the physical system is identified as a first order transfer function: 
   2 2 2 1 10.8 3.347 ( ) 2.0556 (1 ) 1.59 ( )T T C k T k F kk k                                (5.22) 
The prediction of 2ˆT is computed online based on a Kalman filter estimation method.  
       2 2 2 2 2 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ0.8 3.347 ( ) 0.67( ) 2.0556 ( ) 1.1 59 ( )T T C kk k k kT T T k F k         (5.23) 
The detection system is  
0 2 2
1 2 2
0ˆ .5
0.5ˆ
Accept H if T
Detection
Ac
T
Tcept H if T
     
                                         (5.24) 
5.5.1.2 Analysis of attack scenarios and stealthy condition analysis 
Assume that an attacker has managed to gain access to the communication network between 
the sensors and the PLC via the activation switch, and subsequently modified the data packets 
being sent to PLC. In other words, the PLC is spoofed with the tampered temperature reading. 
The attacker’s goal is to tamper the sensor measurement of 2T to drive critical system variables 
out of the safety limit before an alarm is triggered. Two attack scenarios are implemented to 
test the effectiveness of the proposed detection methods.  
The first scenario is a false-data injection attack. The attacker tampers the sensor reading from 
2T to the controller by injecting a negative deviation to the actual value. The attack is described 
can be modeled as: 
     2 2( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0.03( 80)
y
y
T k T k a k
a k k
 
  
                                               (5.25) 
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The system is at the steady operating state when this attack is injected. This negative term will 
deceive the controller to increase the power of the heater to regulate the system back to the 
steady state, herein causing the actual temperature 2T rise to go beyond the safety limit. This 
attack is temporal stealthy by hiding its deviation within the safety threshold. 
The second scenario is a replay attack. Before the attack is launched, the transient history 
'
2 ( )T k  of the heater control loop is recorded when the setpoint of 2T changes from 30℃ to 25℃. 
The attack is formulated as: 
Step I: 2 2( ) ( )( ) 0
T k T k
a k
  
    70k                                            (5.26) 
Step II: 
'
2 2
'
2 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
T k T k
a k T k T k
   

   70 200k                                  (5.27) 
When the control loop is at the steady-state for its setpoint 2T =30℃, the actual 2T is replaced 
with a recorded historical data. The replayed historical data deceives the controller to make 
wrong control actions and cause damage to the system. Since the historical data satisfies the 
safety threshold and the physical laws governing the heater, the attack will not be detected. It 
achieves spatial stealthy. 
5.5.1.3 Analysis using an attack tree  
The above two attack scenarios have been examined to generate an attack tree for the heater 
control system. Two attack scenarios were obtained by corrupting the measurement signal 2T  
from the attack tree in Figure 5.4. Based on the experiment and attack tree, the insider attack 
pattern, attack path, and attack impact on the control loop are analyzed effectively. 
For the false-data injection attack, the attack path is:  (1) 0, 1, 2, 3,P v v v v G . 
For the replay attack, the attack path is:    (2) 0, 1, 7 4, 5, 6,P v v v v v v G  . 
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Figure 5.4 Attack tree analysis of the two attack scenarios 
Based on the attack tree, attack patterns of these two attacks are analyzed to extract their 
similarities and differences in Section 5.5.3. 
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5.5.2 Experimental results 
The steps of a false-data injection attack and a replay attack are further described in Table 5.1. 
The propagation diagram of these attacks and their impacts on the heater behavior are shown 
in Figure 5.5.  
In the false data injection attack, the attacker tampers with the actual 2T slightly to deceive the 
controller, while keeping the magnitude of the residual within the threshold 0.5℃. Results of 
the false data injection attack is demonstrated in Figure 5.6. It can be observed that when the 
actual 2T exceeds its safety limit of 37℃ at 251s, the deceived 2T  sent to the PLC is only 27℃. 
The anomaly detection scheme is not triggered, and the attack goal has been achieved. As such, 
a sophisticated attacker can spoof the measurement data to fit the physics of the system, while 
still driving the critical system variable out of the safety limit unsuspiciously.  
Table 5.1 Steps for mounting insider attacks on the heater control loop 
Attack steps FDI attack action Replay attack action Impact on the system 
ATKS_1 Access to the network Network compromised 
ATKS_2 Port scanning Network compromised 
ATKS_3 Capturing communication data packets Information eavesdropped
ATKS_4 Parsing data packets Information compromised 
ATKS_5 
Creating authenticated 
packets from Attack 
Scenario Generation 
Module to PLC 
Recording a period of 
data and prepare to 
send to PLC 
Communication protocol 
compromised  
ATKS_6 Triggering the attack Vulnerabilities exploited 
ATKS_7 Launching the attack scenario Vulnerabilities exploited 
ATKS_8 False-data injection to PLC 
Replay the recorded 
data to PLC Data manipulated 
ATKS_9 Deceive PLC to increase 2T   PLC deceived 
ATKS_10 Hiding impact of attacks PLC deceived 
ATKS_11 Safety limit exceeded Triggering shutdown system 
ATKS_12 Attack end System disrupted  
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Figure 5.5 Attack process analysis 
 
Figure 5.6 A false-data injection attack on the sensor 
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Results of the replay attack is shown in Figure 5.7. In order to keep the replay attack stealthy, 
in the early stage of the attack, the replayed data is chosen to be the actual data. When the 
changes start at k=78s, the controller is deceived by the attacks to make a wrong command to 
increase 2T . Results have shown that when the actual 2T is beyond its limit at k=163s, the 
system haven’t identified any anomalies. The attack has achieved its desired attack goal. 
Results demonstrate that the proposed method is effective to analyze system vulnerabilities 
related to insider attacks and extract steps of these attacks on physical processes. These results 
can be used for assessing the extent of cyber-physical attacks and for designing potential attack 
detection and defense mechanisms. 
 
Figure 5.7 A replay attack on the sensor 
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5.5.3 Analysis of similarities and differences based on attack pattern 
The similarities and differences for the two stealthy attack scenarios are analyzed according to 
the tuple of the attack pattern  , , , ,s s sAP G R C M P . 
(1) Attack goals sG   
Two different scenarios share the same attack goals, i.e., drive the outlet temperature of the 
heater beyond the safety limit. 
(2) Resources sR   
False-data injection attacks need disruption resources to obtain sensor measurements, the 
replay attack still needs the knowledge of the control loop playing back the recordings. 
(3) Attack stealth conditions sC   
Both attacks have the same constraints for keeping their acts undetected.  
(4) Attack mode M   
While their attack methods are different, it should be mentioned that both the false-data 
injection attack path and the replay attack path use the same entry point A1 and goes to the 
same target G. 
(5) Attack paths and steps P   
The attack paths and steps are different for each scenario, but they have some common attack 
steps along different paths. These common steps would be considered as the critical steps. 
From the simulation results and analysis, the characteristics of insider attacks can be analyzed 
in both the physical and cyber domains. The attack patterns, including insider attack strategies 
and attack paths, can be extracted effectively using the proposed framework. The goal of the 
insider attack can be achieved while keeping the attack process stealthy. It can be seen from 
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the attack tree that one attack scenario may be executed using different attack paths, and that 
different attack scenarios may use the same attack path. 
5.6 Conclusions 
A detailed analysis and formulation of insider attacks are described in this chapter to 
characterize the insider attacks and to identify vulnerabilities that the insider attack could use 
to disrupt physical process from a cyber space. There are two main conclusions drawn from 
this research: 
First, a formulation methodology for insider attacks can be analyzed by attack patterns, which 
are defined by the adversary’s goal, attack mode, attack path, attack resources, and attack 
constraints. To understand impacts of an insider attack, features have been captured and 
analyzed. A generic attack pattern for insider attacks, applicable to different attack scenarios, 
has been modeled and analyzed to characterize the essential features of insider attacks.  
Second, stealthy conditions of insider attacks are analyzed from temporal and spatial 
perspectives. To capture the mapping relationship between cyber-physical attacks and the 
resulting impacts on physical process, impact analysis can be performed using attack tree 
methods.  Data-tampering attack scenarios including deception attack, replay attack, and false 
data injection attack are formulated and analyzed using the proposed framework.  
With this proposed formulation methodology for insider attacks, it is possible to understand 
and to model insider cyber-physical attacks against CPSs, and to analyze impacts of these 
attacks, hence helping to strengthen the security of cyber-physical systems.  
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Chapter 6  
6 Cross-layered Anomaly Detection of Insider Attacks 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, security issues with respect to insider attacks have been discussed. Due to cyber-
physical interactions and unique nature of insider attacks, an adversary is assumed to have the 
resources and authorized access to tamper the sensor and actuator data in a stealthy way. 
Traditional attack detection methods, such as firewalls, network intrusion detection methods 
may be ineffective to insiders who have legitimate access to the networks. To secure such 
systems, it is imperative is to detect and determine any anomalies caused by insider attacks 
before they lead to unacceptable consequences in the physical process. This chapter will 
investigate the situation and develop corresponding methods to detect any anomalies caused 
by stealthy insider attacks.  
Anomaly detection schemes can be categorized into three facets according to three CPS layers: 
(1) the cyber layer; (2) the physical process; and (3) the cyber-physical interactions. Using the 
information of the cyber layer, one can create preventive measures to potential attacks. With 
the knowledge of the physical process, one can analyze and mitigate potential effects of attacks. 
By observing the cyber-physical interactions, it is possible to detect potential cyber-physical 
anomalies. 
In this chapter, a cross-layered anomaly detection framework is developed and implemented 
with the focus on sensor and actuator data tampering by an insider attack. The detection scheme 
can identify the anomalies by analyzing the observed data in the cyber layer, transmitted data 
in the cyber-physical layer and process data in the physical layer.  
This chapter considers anomaly detection of data tampering attacks on sensor data and control 
signals. Please note, since the insider attacker has authorized access to the system and has 
knowledge of the system, access control strategies, such as encryption, are not within the scope 
in this work.  
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The organization of this chapter is as follows: 
1) Development of a general framework for cross-layered detection scheme; 
2) Design two detection algorithms to recognize the anomalies both in temporal and spatial 
dimension. 
3) Evaluation of the proposed framework and methods by performing case studies on the 
experimental security assessment platform. 
6.2 Problem formulation 
6.2.1 System model 
The mathematical models of a cyber-physical system under insider attacks can be described as 
( 1) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
u
y
x k Ax k B u k a k
y k Cx k
y k Cx k a k
   

 
                                   (6.1) 
The attack ( ) mua k   , ( ) pya k  are added to actuators and sensors, ( )y k is the sensor 
signal on the physical side, ( )y k  is the sensor data received on the cyber side.  
Assume that a set of attack sequences can be written as 
: (0) (1) ( )
: (0) (1) ( )
TT T T
u u u u
TT T T
y y y y
a a a a k
a a a a k
   
   


                                (6.2) 
These attack sequences can cause some critical system variables to go out of its normal range. 
The objective of an anomaly detection scheme is to recognize anomalies caused by such attack 
sequences. 
97 
 
 
 
6.2.1.1 Safety set 
When a system is attacked, the first task is to secure the physical process in a safe state. The 
safety of the physical process can be defined by a set of boundaries on the process variables. 
If all the variables are inside of the boundaries, it is said that the system is safe, otherwise, the 
system is in unsafe state. A concept of safety boundary is described in Figure 6.1. 
Definition 6.1: Safety boundary  
A safety boundary   can be defined by a set of constraints given by  
 { ( ( )) 0 | 0,1, , }i x k i h                                                     (6.3) 
where h  is the number of boundaries. 
 
Figure 6.1 Definition of a safety boundary  
Define i  as the distance between the system specific variables and a predefined safety 
boundary  at the sampled instant k  
  
( ( )) 0( ) | ii x ksig k x x                                                        (6.4) 
𝒙ሺ𝒌ሻ 
          
   
Safe state 
 
Safety boundary 
Unsafe state 
( ( )) 0i x k   
xj(k) 
xi(k) 
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where ( ) 1sig k   if ( )x k  is inside the safety boundary, ( ) 1sig k    if ( )x k is outside the safety 
boundary. 
Definition 6.2: Residual 
Let ˆ ( )ax k  be the state estimate of the system when the system is under attack. Then, the 
dynamics of the estimator can be represented as: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ( 1) ( ) ( ))
ˆ ˆ( 1) ( ) ( )
a a a
a
x k Ax k Bu k L y k CAx k CBu k
y k CAx k CBu k
      
  
                              (6.5) 
where ( 1)y k  is the sensor data received on the cyber side, L is an observer gain.  
While the system is being attacked, the residual between the compromised data and the 
estimated data can be defined as 
ˆ( 1) : ( 1) ( 1)r k y k y k                                             (6.6) 
Definition 6.3: Safety set 
At a time instant k, a subset ( )S k  is assigned as a safety set given by 
          ( ) : ( ) pS k r r k                                                       (6.7) 
where ∥. ∥௣ with 1 ൑ 𝑝 ൑ ∞ is the specified safety metrics,  is a predefined threshold for the 
safety set. 
For a stealthy attack, before the attacker reaches the final target, the tampered data are kept 
within the safety boundary to avoid being detected.  
6.2.1.2 Faults and attacks 
The detection problems of insider attacks in cyber-physical systems have some similarities 
with that of faults from sensors and actuators. Faults and attacks can both seen as threats that 
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will have impacts on physical processes. Therefore, many fault detection and isolation 
techniques can be used to detect the adverse effects of insider attacks.  
However, there are some conceptual differences between faults and attacks, traditional faults 
detection and isolation methods cannot be directly applied to detect insider attacks. The most 
distinct difference is that a fault is considered as a non-colluding physical event that occurs in 
components of the system randomly, while an attack often happens in the cyber layer and 
causes effects in the physical process with an malicious intent. An fault happens in a specific 
component and cannot disappear before the component is repaired or replaced, while an attack 
can be performed in many potential points and in a coordinated and stealthy way, and it can 
happen and disappear according to the attack scenarios. The impact of a fault is merely on 
physical processes, while an attack can affect the transmitted both in cyber and physical layers. 
These differences motivate the need to address cross-layer detection problems in a cyber-
physical system. 
6.2.2 Anomaly detection problem 
From the equation (5.2), it can be seen that the attack impacts will be reflected on the output 
sequences (0), (1), , ( )y y y k , regardless the attack is on the sensor data or the actuator data.  
Therefore, it is possible to detect anomalies from the  sensor measurements. 
Given that the set of received output sequences at time k on the cyber side can be described as: 
1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ), , ( ))nY k y k y k y k                                                 (6.8) 
The detection problem can be stated as:  to detect a possible change in (0), (1), , ( )Y Y Y k    with 
the minimum time and to determine if there is an anomaly.  
The decision of the anomaly detection scheme can be formed in a hypothesis: normal 
hypothesis ( 0H ) and attack hypothesis ( 1H ).  
There are two aspects need to be considered for this detection problem:  
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1) Development of a cross-layered framework to deal with anomalies in multiple layers; and 
2) Design of diverse detection algorithms to identify these anomalies and to issue an alarm. 
6.3 Design of a cross-layered anomaly detection scheme  
To recognize anomalies in a multi-layers CPS, it is necessary to consider data in different 
layers to determine the detection rules, that is, a cross-layered detection scheme. This chapter 
will develop a cross-layered detection framework and design corresponding detection 
algorithms.  
6.3.1 Cross-layered detection framework 
The proposed detection system utilizes a defense-in-depth concept to detect anomalies, as is 
shown in Figure 6.2. It integrates the cyber data, network data and process data to provide a 
cross-layer detection. It employs three different detection algorithms across the three layers. 
The first layer is a traditional rule-based intrusion detection method, to prevent external 
intruders and limit the resources available to inside attackers. Insiders may bypass this 
detection layer in some situations. The second layer is in the cyber-physical layer, a data-driven 
algorithm is proposed to detect the anomalies among the transmitted data. The data flow 
transmitted in the cyber-physical network and the inherent physical laws of the process system 
are integrated for detection in this layer. The third layer is in the physical layer, a model-based 
state estimation algorithm and a temporal-based detection algorithm are proposed to detect 
anomalies in the physical processes.  
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Figure 6.2 A cross-layered anomaly detection framework 
A detailed flowchart of the proposed anomaly detection scheme is shown in Figure 6.3. In 
order to find the anomalies caused by attacks as early as possible, the scheme reads both 
network and process data online, performs different detection methods in multiple layer, and 
identifies if there are any abnormal changes to the data. 
Due to the distinct differences between attacks and faults, this detection framework considers 
a cross-layered detection scheme, which is also different from the traditional fault detection 
and isolation techniques that only consider the physical layers. For a fault detection scheme, 
only D3 is considered, which is not sufficient  nor effective to detect insider attacks.  
The proposed detection scheme provides a cross-layered detection framework: D1 is focused 
on the network intrusion detection to provide the initial detection of attacks. D2 integrates the 
data both in physical layer and physical layer to identify the anomalies among the cyber-
physical interactions in case that D1 fails, which is different from the traditional fault detection 
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methods. D3 is originated from a traditional method, which provides the anomaly detection in 
the physical process. In this chapter, the focus is on the development of the second and third 
layers in the proposed detection framework.  
Please note that, although the proposed detection framework is for detection of attacks, the 
model-based detection system in the third layer in this chapter can also be used to detect 
anomalies from both attacks and faults.  
6.3.2 Cross-layered detection methods  
Based on the discussion in Chapter 5, insider attacks attempt to keep the attack stealthy using 
known information about the spatial and temporal-based knowledge of the system. To reveal 
the anomalies by stealthy attacks, two diverse methods are designed. One is a model-based 
method for temporal anomalies, in which the accumulated residuals of the compromised 
measurements are calculated and evaluated. The other is data-driven method to detect spatial 
anomalies, in which patterns of variables are learned and analyzed.  
6.3.2.1 Model-based anomaly detection 
A model-based anomaly detection method can detect malicious deviations by comparing the 
expected process behavior with the received process data. Most of the model-based detection 
methods are based on residuals, and only the current state of the system is considered. In this 
chapter, a state estimation-based CUSUM method that takes into account both the current state 
and the history state is used for anomaly detection. 
The basic idea of this detection scheme is demonstrated in Figure 6.4. The scheme consists of 
three stages: state prediction, residual generation, and anomaly detection. The state of the 
process is predicted based on the process model, residuals are generated based on the estimated 
data and the measured data, and the cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm is used to process 
the residuals and detect the anomalies. 
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Figure 6.3 Flow chart of the proposed methodology 
 
104 
 
 
 
State prediction
Residual generation Anomaly detection
Alarm
State estimation-based anomaly detection
( )y k
ˆ( )y k
( )u k
ˆ( 1)y k 
 
Figure 6.4 Functional elements in a model-based anomaly detection 
To formalize the anomaly detection problem, the detection algorithm–a nonparametric 
cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm [162] is as follows: if the historical output sequence of 
the physical system ( 1)y k   and the current control input sequence ( )u k  and their relationship 
are known, the residual can be generated by comparing the predicted output ˆ( )y k with the 
measured sensor output ( )y k , and then anomalies caused by attacks through tampering with 
the sensor data can be potentially detected based on the residuals. 
1) State prediction 
This step is to provide an prediction of the system. In this dissertation, a Kalman filter is used 
to estimate the system state and predict the system output. The Kalman filter algorithm is listed 
in the following [93]. 
 
1
ˆ ˆ( 1) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ( ) )
ˆ( 1) ( ) ( )
( ) ( 1)
( ) ( ) ( )
T T
T
x k Ax k Bu k LD
L P k C CP k C R
D y k CAx k CBu k
P k AP k A Q
P k I LC P k
  


   
 
   
  
 
                                             (6.9) 
where L is Kalman gain, ( )P k  is the covariance of state vector estimate, ( )P k  is the error 
covariance ahead,  Q is the process noise covariance, and R is measurement noise covariance. 
The output can be predicted based on the current estimation can be calculated as: 
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ˆ ˆ( 1) ( ) ( )y k CAx k CBu k                                              (6.10) 
This estimation method takes into account of the historical output when predicting the future 
output.  
2) Residual computation 
Define norm of the residual ˆ( ) ( )y k y k  as the detected sequence. When there are no attacks, 
ˆ( ) ( )y k y k  is identically to be zero.  
Considering the measurement noise and error of the process model, under normal operation 
ˆ( ) ( )y k y k  is normally less than a predefined value.  
In order to reduce false alarm rate, a positive constant b  is used as an offset to compensate the 
measurement noises and errors of process models.   
The offset residual can be represented as: 
ˆ( ) ( ) ( )z k y k y k b                                                       (6.11) 
3) Computation of b  
Given that  minb  is the averaged residual computed using historical data of the physical process 
under the normal operation, b is selected to be larger than minb . 
min ˆ( ) ( )b E y k y k                                               (6.12) 
4) CUSUM parameters 
Based on the offset residual in Equation (6.11), a nonparametric CUSUM is calculated as 
( ) ( ( 1) ( )) , (0) 0S k S k z k S                                            (6.13) 
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where ( )S k  is cumulative sum of the offset residuals, ( ( 1) ( ))S k z k    is the max of
(0, ( 1) ( ))S k z k  .  
The corresponding decision rule becomes 
0
1
( )Detection Logic ( )
H S k
H S k


                                             (6.14) 
where   is a threshold selected based on the false alarm rate. 
The observation ( )y k  starts under normal operation hypothesis 0H . When the CUSUM 
surpasses the threshold, the detection scheme changes to hypothesis 1H  to raise an anomaly 
alarm. 
A false alarm is when the detection scheme identifies the observed data as an anomaly, but the 
activity is a normal behavior.  
From Equation (6.11) - (6.14), the time to detect an attack (detection time) increases as b 
increases, but false alarm rate decreases .   
From Equation (6.14), the threshold   of CUSUM method presents a trade-off between the 
detection time and the false alarm rate. The false alarm rate decreases as   increases,  but the 
detection time will increase as well. 
6.3.2.2 Data-driven clustering-based detection  
Although the model-based detection method can predict system outputs and detect anomalies, 
they require an accurate model of the physical process, which is often not available.  To address 
this issue, a data-driven clustering-based detection method is proposed. The clustering-based 
detection method is based on historical dynamic behaviors. They can capture the correlations 
or relationships among variables and check the data consistency to identify anomalies of the 
system. 
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The clustering approach classiﬁes measurements into several groups, each group is called a 
cluster. Within a cluster, the data shares similar patterns. Outliers are defined as the data that 
does not belong to the predefined clusters. The inputs to the clustering algorithm are the 
measurement data. The output of the clustering algorithm is a subset containing a speciﬁc 
operating state of the physical system. 
A flow chart of the clustering detection scheme can be summarized in Figure 6.5. The detection 
algorithm [78] is described as follows. 
Define N  as the total number of observations of y , l as the number of clusters, m as the number 
of  data in a cluster, ( )C i  as cluster i, and ( )y j   as the vector of observations at moment j.  
Start
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Figure 6.5 Data-driven clustering-based detection method 
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1) Cluster extraction 
The clustering detection method collects the raw data  under normal operation and trains the 
data for clustering. The purpose of this step is to get the parameters for the clustering. 
The centroid iC and radius iR  of a cluster is defined and computed as: 
1
2
1
1 ( )
1 ( ( ) )
N
i
j
N
i i
j
C y j
N
R y j C
N



 


                                                      (6.15) 
 where iR  denotes the average distance of all measurements to the centroid iC .  
For a set of measurement data, l clusters will be generated according to the computed centroids 
and radius.  
2) Cluster classification 
In this step,  the detection scheme collects the measurement data online and partitions them 
into l clusters. Each data belongs to a cluster with the nearest centroids.   
Given that n(i) measurements are selected as the initial cluster ( )C i . If ( )n i m  , the selected 
cluster meet the required minimum number of data in a cluster. Otherwise, it is treated as an 
outlier.  
For each initialized cluster, the Euclidean distance between the measurement and the centroid 
is calculated as: 
( )i id y j C                                                             (6.16) 
Outliers can be classified by comparing the distance di with the radius iR  of the cluster.  
3) Anomaly detection  
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For the anomaly detection, various operational states are classified into different clusters, the 
clustering detection algorithm evaluates the clusters and provides a binary classification as 0H  
normal or 1H  abnormal. In this chapter, clusters are classified as two categories: (1) Cluster 1 
for normal operating state, and (2) Cluster 2 for abnormal state.  
6.4 Case studies 
This section presents case studies and performance analysis of the proposed anomaly detection 
framework with two detection algorithms.  
A security platform on NPCTF environment as implemented in Chapter 4 is used. The same 
heater control loop as shown in Figure 4.13 is used. The safety limit of 2T is set to be lower 
than 37℃, and the change rate is set to be less than 0.05℃/second. 
6.4.1 Experimental setup 
The experiment scenarios are outlined in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1 Case studies for the cross-layer detection scheme 
Experimental scenarios 
Attack scenarios 
Stealthy false‐data injection (FDI) attack on  2T   
Stealthy replay attack on  2T   
Detection methods 
Implementation of the cross‐layered anomaly detection 
Model‐based CUSUM method 
Data‐driven clustering method 
6.4.1.1 Attack scenarios 
Two stealthy attack scenarios have been implemented to test the effectiveness of the proposed 
detection methods. The attacker’s goal is to tamper the sensor measurement of 2T to drive the 
heater system out of the safe region before an alarm is triggered.  
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The first scenario is to tamper the sensor data 2T  going to the controller by injecting a negative 
deviation Δ 2T = -0.02(k-25) to the actual value at k=25s. The system has been operating at the 
steady state, when the attack is initiated. The deviation-0.02(k-25) will deceive the controller 
to increase the power of the heater to regulate the system back to the desired steady state, herein 
causing the rise of 2T beyond its safety limit. This attack is temporal stealthy because it hides 
its deviation under the safety threshold. 
The second scenario is a replay attack. Before the attack is launched, the transient response of 
the heater control loop subjected to a change in the setpoint of 2T from 30℃ to 25℃ has been 
recorded.  When the control loop operates steadily at its setpoint 2T =30℃, the actual sensor 
measurement of 2T  is replaced with the recorded historical data. The controller will regulate 
the system according to the replayed data, which then cause the heater to increase its power 
and drives the actual 2T  beyond its safety limit. Since the historical data satisfies the safety 
threshold and the physical laws of the heater, this attack is essentially spatial stealthy. 
6.4.1.2 Cross-layered detection scheme 
The proposed cross-layer anomaly detection scheme is implemented aside the supervisory 
station of NPCTF. It collects and processes the data online through an OPC client, it monitors 
the networks through Snort, the sampling period is chosen to be 1 second. Rule-based method 
in the first layer is implemented in the Snort environment, white lists are set to prevent network 
intrusion from external attackers. A data-driven clustering-based detection method in the 
second layer and a CUSUM detection method in the third layer are implemented in MATLAB 
environment. The data-driven detection scheme triggers an alarm when outliers are classified 
as an abnormal cluster. The model-based detection scheme arises an anomaly alarm after the 
detection variable goes beyond a specific threshold calculated in term of CUSUM.  
1) Parameters in the model-based detection algorithm  
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To implement the proposed detection framework in Figure 6.1, selection of the CUSUM 
parameters are described as follows.  
The following model is used to estimate the system state by using a Kalman filter.  
   2 2 2 1 10.8 3.347 ( ) 2.0556 (1 ) 1.59 ( )T T C k T k F kk k                                (6.17) 
where  2T k  is the outlet temperature of the heater, 1( )T k  is the inlet temperature of the heater,
2 ( )C k  is the current of the heater, 1( )F k  is the water flow rate of the heater. 
The prediction of 2ˆ ( )T k is computed online based on a Kalman filter method.  
       2 2 2 2 2 1 1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ1
( )( ( ) )
( ) 0.64
0.8 3.347 ( ) ( ) 2.0556 ( ) 1.59
( 1)
( ) (1 ) (
(
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)T T C k L T T T k Fk k k k
L P k P k R
P k P k
L
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P k P k
  


   
 
 

 



  (6.18) 
where P(0)=0, 44 10Q   , and R=0.25. 
For the parameters in CUSUM method, in order to select a suitable value for b, the residual 
2 2ˆ ( ) ( )T k T k  between the estimation 2ˆ ( )T k and sensor measurement 2 ( )T k  is computed 
based on 24 hours of historical data under the normal operation, the empirical value of bmin is 
computed to be 0.316℃, b is chosen to be 0.5 in the case studies.   
The threshold   of CUSUM method is selected as 0.5℃.  
2) Data-driven clustering-based detection algorithm  
The proposed clustering-based detection method is implemented with N=200, m=30, l = 
2. The steady state and transient state are trained in advance based on the historical data, 
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the centroid for the normal state cluster is set to be 29.85℃, and the radius is calculated to be 
0.5℃. The decision threshold is selected as 1℃. 
Implementation of the proposed clustering detection scheme undertakes the detection of two 
distinct clusters. The ﬁrst cluster reﬂects a normal steady-state operation, while the second 
cluster reﬂects observations which may be attributed to attacks. 
In order to reflect the nature of the clusters, a cluster index is defined as: 
1,  normal state    Cluster index 2,  abnormal state
   . 
3) Selection of evaluation metrics  
To evaluate the proposed methods, detection effectiveness and detection time are considered 
as the evaluation metrics. Detection effectiveness is evaluated if the attack is detected before 
it has driven the critical system variables out of the safety set. Detection time is the time that 
it takes to detect an anomaly caused by the attack. 
6.4.2 Performance results 
6.4.2.1 Detection results under a FDI attack 
Results of the model-based detection method and data-driven detection method under a 
stealthy FDI attack are shown in Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7, respectively.  
The results in Figure 6.6 have demonstrated that the model-based detection scheme can detect 
the anomaly effectively. The attack is injected at k=25s, the observed 2T is close to its 
estimation to keep the attack stealthy. Although the residual is still within the threshold, the 
cumulative sum of residuals has indicated an anomaly and arises the alarm at k =49s.  
The results in Figure 6.7 have shown that the clustering-based method can also identify the 
abnormal cluster at k =90s. When an attack is launched at k=25s, the observed measurements 
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matches with the cluster of normal operation. As the deviation between the observed 2T  and 
the expected 2T increases, an abnormal cluster is declared. 
 
Figure 6.6 Model-based anomaly detection under a FDI attack 
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Figure 6.7 Clustering-based anomaly detection under a FDI attack 
6.4.2.2 Detection results under a replay attack 
Results of the model-based detection scheme under a replay attack is demonstrated in Figure 
6.8. In order to be stealthy, the replayed data to the controller meets the steady operating 
condition at the beginning of the attack. At k =85s, the recorded data starts to change from 30℃ 
to 25℃, while the controller still maintains the system at its setpoint 2T =30℃. Although the 
replayed data 2T is still normal, the cumulative sum of the residuals recognizes that there is an 
anomaly and raises the alarm at k =94s.  
Results of the data-driven detection scheme under the replay attack are shown in Figure 6.9. 
Experimental results have demonstrated that the data-driven detection scheme identiﬁes two 
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clusters. The first cluster includes both steady-state and transient dynamics, the second cluster 
is identified as abnormal states because the replayed data does not match the pre-defined steady 
state. Since the replayed data comes from the historical data in normal state, the steady state at 
30℃ is classified as a normal cluster. When replayed 2T starts to change from 30℃ to 25℃,  
it is still within the radius at the beginning, hence the generated cluster is still considered as a 
normal cluster. However, the replayed 2T  already deviates significantly from the normal state 
afterwards, the cluster index changes from normal to abnormal at k =120s, and the generated 
cluster is classified to be abnormal and the alarm is triggered. 
 
Figure 6.8 Model-based anomaly detection under a replay attack 
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Figure 6.9 Clustering-based anomaly detection under a replay attack 
6.4.2.3 Detection Effectiveness 
Based on the defined security metrics, the results of the implemented detection methods are 
summarized in Table 6.2. The results have shown that both detection methods are effective in 
detecting attacks.  
Table 6.2 Results of detection methods 
Attack 
scenario 
Attack 
start time 
Detection time  Detection effectiveness 
Model‐based  Data‐driven  Model‐based  Data‐driven 
FDI attack  k=25s  k=49s  k=90s  Detected   Detected  
Replay attack  k=75s  k=94s  k=120s  Detected   Detected  
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Model-based detection method arises the alarm soon after the data is tempered during the 
attacks. The detection time of the data-driven clustering method is longer than that of the 
model-based method, especially for a FDI attack. This is because that the injected FDI attack 
generates a very small deviation at each time step, it is difficult for the clustering method to 
classify the attacked data from the normal data in a short time. But for CUSUM methods, the 
cumulative sum of the residuals includes the historical residuals, which is more effective  than 
clustering methods which use the current state of the system only. 
In the case studies, the threshold   of CUSUM method is conservatively selected to be 0.5℃, 
no false alarm is encountered during the experiments. 
6.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a cross-layered detection scheme is developed to detect anomalies caused by 
different stealthy insider cyber-physical attacks. The detection scheme considers a hierarchical 
approach by combining different detection methods in different layers to provide a defense-in-
depth detection against the attacks. In the proposed detection scheme, the first layer is a rule-
based detection, only the authorized users can gain access to the system. The second layer 
includes a data-driven clustering-based method, which is to identify anomalies from cyber-
physical interactions. The third layer is a state estimation-based CUSUM method to detect the 
anomalies based on physical process data. These methods work can together to provide a 
defense-in-depth detection scheme.  
Results have shown that the proposed detection scheme is effective in detecting insider attacks. 
The model-based CUSUM detection method can detect anomalies quickly and effectively. For 
situations where physical model of the system is difficult to be identified, data-driven approach 
can provide with adaptivity and flexibility. These different detection methods can work 
independently or can also be integrated to detect anomalies in multi-layers. 
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Chapter 7  
7 An Attack Defensive Scheme against Insider Attacks 
7.1 Introduction 
If an insider attack is launched on a cyber-physical system, a detection scheme should identify 
the anomaly and alert the operators and activate attack mitigation strategies at the same time. 
Attack mitigation system should then respond to the attack and secure the physical system in 
a safe state during and after this attack. This chapter is focused on designing an attack defensive 
framework to provide a defense-in-depth detection, response and mitigation strategies to 
insider attacks.  
In order to mitigate impacts of these attacks, an attack-resilience control is one that can react, 
tolerate and reconfigure the system [103]. It is important for a cyber-physical system to 
incorporate with some attack-resilient capabilities into its control systems so that the system 
can be maintained to be within the safe operation range.  
In this chapter, an attack-resilient control system is designed to mitigate the impacts of attacks. 
The resilient control system includes an attack response scheme, a decision-making scheme, 
and a bank of controllers. The attack response scheme responds to the detected anomalies. The 
decision scheme enables the control system switch to a suitable controller in response to the 
identified attack anomalies.  
It is assumed that the supervisory layer is secure and could not be penetrated by the attacker. 
The supervisory station is isolated from the rest of the system and is assumed to be secure. It 
contains a control system and an anomaly detection scheme.  
This chapter is organized as follows. First, an attack defensive framework is presented in 
Section 7.2. Second, design of a resilient control system in response to an attack, a decision-
making scheme and corresponding controllers are discussed in Section 7.3. Subsequently, case 
studies are included to demonstrate the effectiveness in Section 7.4 and finally conclusions are 
drawn in Section 7.5. 
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7.2 An attack defensive framework 
An effective defense-in-depth strategy requires a holistic approach to leverage all of the 
resources in order to provide effective layers of protection against attacks [163]. In this section, 
an attack defensive framework is proposed to address multi-layered defense strategies as 
shown in Figure 7.1.  
1. Attack Prevention 
4. Attack Mitigation
Decision-
making
Attack-resilient 
control Recovery 
2. Attack Detection
Cyber 
detection
Cyber-physical 
detection 
Physical 
detection 
3. Attack Response 
Isolation Redundancy Replace
Firewalls Security boundary
Safety 
thresholds
 
Figure 7.1 A defense-in-depth framework 
There are four defense layers in the proposed framework. The first layer includes passive 
prevention strategies against insider attacks, the second layer consists of active detection 
techniques to recognize anomalies. The third layer contains responses to attacks, and the fourth 
layer is composed of different attack-resilient control systems to mitigate attack impacts and 
maintain system performance.  
This attack-resilient control framework has a similar structure with a fault tolerant control 
framework. However, due to the different features of faults and attacks, different defensive 
approaches need to be considered.  In general, a fault tolerant control may be achieved through 
safety boundary control, physical process monitoring and repair and replacement of the 
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physical components, respectively. On the other hand, an attack-resilient control system needs 
to consider both the cyber and physical enhancements and addressing multi-layer security 
issues. Within the proposed defensive framework, the focus includes both cyber security 
enhancements and physical process control. 
1) Attack prevention 
Attack prevention aims to decrease the likelihood of attacks through a combination of multiple 
approaches, such as security boundaries, firewalls and safety limits. These are performed 
offline before the system is attacked. 
2) Attack detection 
For attacks that are not preventable, online detection methods can be applied to identify 
anomalies caused by attacks. A cross-layered detection scheme has been considered in Chapter 
6.  A model-based detection method and a data-driven method can work together to provide a 
defense-in-depth detection scheme. 
3) Attack response 
Once an attack is detected, the corrupted measurement data needs to be isolated and replaced. 
In the current framework, the tampered data can be corrected through estimated measurements 
or through redundant measurements. 
4) Attack mitigation 
Once an anomaly is detected and its nature is diagnosed, mitigation strategies can be taken to 
reduce the attack impacts and maintain the system in a safe state. In the proposed framework, 
attack mitigation can be achieved through a decision logic scheme and a set of attack-resilient 
controllers. 
It is worthwhile to mention that, in this framework, attack detection and prevention schemes 
do not affect normal operations of the system, only attack response and attack mitigation 
strategies can reconfigure the system. For a safety-critical system, even if the system is 
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maintained within a safe state by a mitigation scheme, the employed attack response scheme 
and resilient control strategy are still considered as a temporary solution before a human 
operator reacts to the anomaly detection alarm.  
This chapter is focused on design of attack responses and mitigation strategies to secure the 
cyber-physical system in an event of an attack. 
7.3 Design of an attack-resilient control system  
Given the existence of an attack, one of the important requirements for safety-critical systems 
is to be attack resilient. Thus, design of an attack-resilient control system has two objectives. 
One is to isolate the corrupted data from the attacks, the other one is to reduce its attack impacts 
and maintain the system safety and performance at an acceptable degree.  
7.3.1 Attack response scheme 
Attack response is a follow-up action soon after the detection scheme arises an alarm, it means 
that the measurement data might have been corrupted. An attack response scheme has to 
evaluate the consequence of the attack and to isolate the tampered data to prevent further 
damages to the system.  
 
( )u k( )cy k Resilient 
controlDetection
ˆ( ) ( )cy k y k
Attack Response
( ) ( )cy k y k 
1H
0H
ˆ( )y k
( )y k
 
Figure 7.2 A conceptual diagram of the attack response scheme 
Given that the state estimation ˆ( )y k  is available, an attack response scheme is shown in Figure 
7.2.  It consists of two sequences of measurements, one is the estimated output ˆ( )y k  and the 
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other is the measured signal ( )y k . Once an attack is detected (H1), the scheme will replace the 
measurement ( )y k  by the estimated data ˆ( )y k  to the controller instead. 
Since there is a risk of false alarms in the detection scheme, it is important to make sure that 
the estimated output ˆ( )y k  will not cause safety concerns to rest of the system. Therefore, this 
proposed attack response method can only be considered as a temporary solution to isolate the 
potential attacks before a human operator confirms and responds to the situation.  
Another potential solution is to add redundant communication and measurement channels for 
safety-critical variables, which are independent of the current networks and measurements. 
When an attack happens, these redundancies can be used to correct the corrupted data which 
is sent to the controller.  
One difference between a fault isolation and an attack response scheme is redundancy 
consideration. In a fault isolation scheme, redundant components in physical process are 
considered, while redundant communication channels are considered in an attack response. 
7.3.2 Resiliency in mitigation 
Once the anomalies are detected, an attack-resilient control scheme should be triggered. Since 
insider attacks also have impacts on physical processes, fault-tolerant control can be applied 
to attack-resilient control scheme. 
Since attacks are difficult to predict and may drive system to various dangerous conditions, the 
focus of this section is on design of an attack-resilient control scheme to mitigate anomalies 
resulted from an attack. There are two aspects to be considered in the design an attack-resilient 
control scheme: one is a decision-making scheme to determine which control mode should be 
activated to defend the attack; the other is the designing of corresponding controller to realize 
the control objectives. A design diagram of a resilient control system is shown in Figure 7.3.  
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Figure 7.3 Structure of an attack-resilient control system 
The decision-making scheme can be designed based on multiple criteria: safety, security and 
system performance [156]. Based on the replaced or corrected data from the attack response 
scheme, the decision-making scheme will analyze the security and safety conditions and 
determine a control mode to mitigate the attack. With a switchable control mode, the controller 
can mitigate the attack and maintain the system performance in an acceptable degree. 
In this chapter, a decision-making scheme is designed based on current safety region of the 
system once an attack is detected. There are three regions for a system state, as is shown in 
Figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.4 Safety region for the decision-making scheme [155]  
1) Safe region: in this region, the system is safe and there are no anomalies detected. 
2) Resilient region: an anomaly has been detected while the system is in still safe state, the 
detected anomaly can be mitigated through a resilient control method. 
3) Unsafe region: an anomaly has been detected, while system is already in an unsafe state, 
the detected anomaly is unacceptable. This is a forbidden region. 
Based on the system state, there are three control modes that can be triggered by the decision-
making scheme. 
1) When the system is in the safe region, control mode #1 is used as a normal control. The 
goal of the controller is to maintain the current performance without any reconfiguration. 
2) When the system is in the resilient region, control mode #2 is triggered as a resilient control. 
The goal of the controller is to mitigate system state back to the safe region or degrade the 
system performance to reduce impacts of the attack. 
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3) When the system is in the unsafe region, control mode #3 is triggered as an emergency 
control. The goal of the controller is to take immediate actions to minimize damages to the 
system. 
7.3.3 Automated mitigation and supervised mitigation 
As is mentioned in Section 7.2, the mitigation is considered as a temporary solution to protect 
the system in case there are anomalies. There are two ways to perform the mitigation strategies. 
One is automated mitigation, which means that the resilient control scheme will be triggered 
automatically once an anomaly is detected. The other is supervised mitigation, in which the 
security situation needs to be confirmed by a human operator when the detection scheme raises 
an alarm, and then the proposed resilient control scheme will be activated if the operator 
confirms the security situation. 
Since there might be false rate of detection schemes, automated mitigation should ensure the 
system variables are maintained within their safety limits. Otherwise the automated mitigation 
may make a wrong decision on the controller selection.  
7.4 Case studies 
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, case studies are presented in this section. 
System performance is analyzed based on the proposed defensive framework and a resilient 
control on NPCTF. The heater control loop as described in Figure 4.13 is used again. 
7.4.1 Experiment design 
The purpose of the case studies is to experimentally validate the developed attack defensive 
framework and resilient control techniques.  The model and the state estimation of the heater 
control system is given in Equation (6.17) and Equation (6.18) , details can be found in Section 
6.4.1.2. 
7.4.1.1 Attack scenarios 
Two attack scenarios have been considered in this chapter.  
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The first scenario (SA1) is a false-data injection attack on the sensor data of 2 ( )T k . The 
tampered data sent to the controller is 
 22
2
( ) 0.03( 30) 30( ) ( )                        30
T k k k
T k
T k k
    
                                              (7.1) 
The second scenario (SA2) is a replay attack. The tampered data sent to the controller is  
'
2
2
2
( ) 70 200( ) ( ) 70
T k k
T k
T k k
    
                                                         (7.2) 
where '2 ( )T k  is a set of recorded historical data on the transient response of 2 ( )T k  when the 
setpoint is changed from 30℃ to 25℃.  
7.4.1.2 Attack defensive framework 
The attack defensive strategies are presented in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1 Implemented attack defensive strategies 
 
1) Attack prevention D0 
Two boundaries are set in this layer. One is the safety limit of 2T  as 37℃, which is set within 
the detection system; the other is the security boundary to prevent external or unauthorized 
users, which is set in the firewalls inside the supervisory station. 
Framework Methods Techniques 
Attack prevention D0 Safety limit and security boundary 
Attack detection 
D1 Rule-based network intrusion detection 
D2 CUSUM method: 1, 0.5b     
D3 Data-driven clustering-based method 
Attack response R1 Attack response 
Attack mitigation M1 Decision-making unit M2 Resilient controllers 
127 
 
 
 
 
2) Attack detection 
The cross-layered detection scheme is implemented in this framework, which includes three 
detection methods referred as D1, D2 and D3. 
D1 is a rule-based detection method, which is implemented in a Snort environment to define 
the scope of the attack defined in this dissertation. The detection rules include a whitelist for 
the authorized users and consistency monitoring of network traffics. This method can detect 
network intrusions and interruptions to the system.  
D2 and D3 are implemented with the same settings as in Section 6.4.1.2. 
3) Attack response 
R1 is an attack response scheme to react to the detection anomalies. Since there are no 
redundant sensors and communication channels in the heater control loop, in order to isolate 
the measurement data 2 ( )T k , the estimated 2ˆ ( )T k  is used to replace 2 ( )T k  instead when there 
is an anomaly detected.  
Measurement data to the controller 2 ( )cT k is set as 
2 0
2
2 1
( )( ) ˆ ( )
c T k HT k
T k H
 

                                                            (7.3) 
where the estimated temperature 2ˆ ( )T k  is computed using Equation (6.18), 2 ( )T k  is the 
measured sensor data in the control side. 
4) Attack mitigation 
To mitigate impacts of an attack, the decision-making scheme needs to determine a resilient 
control mode based on the detected anomalies, and trigger the corresponding controller. In this 
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case, M1 is a decision-making unit, to decide  which controller should be activated. M2 is a 
set of PID controllers to mitigate the system back to a safe state. 
Safety region of this case study is set to be: 
a) Safe region: 0H  is true. 
b) Resilient region: 1H  is true,  but 2 ( )T k  and 2ˆ ( )T k  are lower than 37 ℃ 
c) Unsafe region: 1H  is true, and 2 ( )T k  or 2ˆ ( )T k  is higher than 37 ℃. 
The decision-making logic in this case study has three control modes. 
a) Control mode #1: normal control. 
When there is no attack detected, normal control mode is selected. The observed data 2 ( )T k is 
sent to the controller,  a PD controller is employed with parameters 6.5, 1P DK K  .  
b) Control mode #2: attack-resilient control. 
When the system is in resilient region, an attack-resilient controller is selected to mitigate 
impacts of the attack. The observed data 2 ( )T k is isolated first and the estimated 2ˆ ( )T k  is sent 
to the controller, a PID controller is employed to regulate the system back to its setpoint at 
30 ℃. Parameters of the  PID controller are 7.6, 0.1, 1P I DK K K     
c) Control mode #3: emergency control. 
When the system is in the unsafe state, an emergency control mode is triggered.  Under this 
situation, the heater will be shut down to avoid further damage, and the emergency control 
system ECCS in NPCTF will be triggered to ensure that the physical process is safe. 
In this case study, the false-data injection attack and the replay attack have been implemented 
on the heater control system, respectively. The detection scheme including D0- D3 is used to 
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detect anomalies. Attack response R1 is to respond to the attacks, and mitigation methods M1 
and M2 are to mitigate the system. The proposed attack-resilient control system is reconfigured 
in the supervisory station and then loaded into PLC in advance.  
7.4.2 Experimental results  
To study the effectiveness of the framework, the experiments are carried out under two cases. 
The first case is an automated attack response and mitigation, in which all the defensive 
strategies are executed automatically. The second case is a supervised attack response and 
mitigation, which requires a human operator to confirm and release the response after an attack 
is detected. 
7.4.2.1 Automated attack response and mitigation 
Performance of the proposed automated attack defensive scheme under two attack scenarios 
have been demonstrated in Figure 7.5.  
1) Results of automated mitigation to a FDI attack 
The performance of the system when the sensor data of 2T is tampered by the stealthy false-
data injection attack is shown in Figure 7.5(a).  
The FDI attack starts at t k=30s, the detection system detects the anomaly at k=54s. Although 
the detection threshold has been exceeded at this time, the actual 2 ( )T k  is still around its 
setpoint, and is close to its estimation 2ˆ ( )T k . The automated attack response scheme replaces 
2 ( )T k  by the estimated 2ˆ ( )T k , and the resilient control system keeps 2 ( )T k  in its steady state 
despite of the attack. 
2) Results of automated mitigation to a replay attack 
The results of automated mitigation against a replay attack are shown in Figure 7.5(b).  Before 
the attack is launched, the replayed data is recorded in advance by the attacker. System is 
operating at the steady state. At k=70s, the replay attack starts to send the historical data of 2T
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to the controller. At k=80s, the historical data  starts to decrease the temperature from 30 ℃ to 
25 ℃.  
 
Figure 7.5 Performance of the automated attack-resilient control scheme 
The detection system identifies this attack at k=93s, and the attack response scheme is triggered 
to isolate the attacked 2 ( )T k  and the estimated 2ˆ ( )T k  is used by the controller instead. Since 
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the estimated 2ˆ ( )T k is close to the actual 2 ( )T k , it is relatively easy for the controller to 
maintain the system in its safe region. 
 It can be observed that the automated attack response and mitigation strategies are effective 
to eliminate the effects of these attacks and maintain the system performance.  
7.4.2.2 Supervised attack response and mitigation 
This case study involves three stages: (1)before an attack (normal operation), (2)during an 
attack without mitigation (validation of detection effectiveness), and (3) during an attack with 
mitigation (validation of mitigation effectiveness). Experimental results are shown in Figure 
7.6. 
1) Results of supervised mitigation to a FDI attack 
Results of a supervised mitigation against the stealthy false-data injection attack are provided 
in Figure 7.6(a). 
As can be seen, prior to the launch of the attack, the measurement data of 2T is in its steady 
state 30℃. At k=30s, a FDI attack is initialized to the process the tampered 2T decreases by a 
deviation of -0.03 (k-30) ℃. No mitigation is used in the period from k=30s to k=100s, the 
attacker deceives the controller to increase the power of the heater and drives the actual 
temperature 2T higher than its setpoint. The attack is detected at k=56s and an operator confirms 
this situation and responds to this attack shortly after. 
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed defensive strategies, the resilient control system 
is activated by the operator at k=100s.  The measured 2 ( )T k  is replaced by the estimated 2ˆ ( )T k , 
the resilient control mode is triggered.  It can be seen that the actual 2 ( )T k is moving back to 
its steady state at around 30 ℃ starting from k=126s. The resilient control scheme recovers the 
system to its normal operating condition after the attack is detected and isolated. 
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Figure 7.6 Performance of the supervised attack-resilient control scheme 
2) Results of supervised mitigation to a replay attack 
Results of mitigation against a replay attack are shown in Figure 7.6(b).   
Before an attack happens, the system is operating at the steady state. At k=70s, the replay attack 
starts to send the historical data of 2T to the controller. To keep the attack stealthy, the replayed 
data is in the same steady state at the beginning of this attack. At k=80s, the historical data  
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starts to change the setpoint of 2T  from 30 ℃ to 25 ℃. Since the controller regulates the system 
based on the replayed data, which causes the continued increase of the actual temperature 2T . 
The detection system raises an alarm at k=88s. 
The attack-resilient control system starts operation at k=121s, the estimated 2ˆ ( )T k  is used by 
the controller. Results have shown that the proposed attack defensive strategies can bring the 
system back to its steady state from k=147s onward. 
Under the case of the replay attack, when the measured 2T is replayed by the attacker, the 
detection scheme arises an alarm and the attacked data is replaced. Since the estimated value 
of 2ˆT has deviated from the setpoint 30℃, the decision scheme switches the control objective 
to maintain the system in a safe state.  
 
Results in Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 have demonstrated that the proposed framework is 
effective to defend against stealthy attacks on sensor data. When an anomaly is detected, the 
corrupted data is replaced by its estimated values, the decision-making logic will respond to 
these anomalies and select the most appropriate control algorithm, and the resilient control 
scheme can recover the system characteristics and return it to the normal operating conditions.  
Because the resilient control requires system reconfiguration when responding to attacks, it is 
often required an operator’s confirmation for safety-critical processes, instead of automatically 
react to the attack. Hence, although the proposed mitigation methods can maintain the system 
in a safe state, it is considered to be a temporary solution at the best. Human operator will make 
the final decision. 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, an attack defensive framework and an attack-resilient control scheme are 
proposed to mitigate impacts of insider attacks. The overall framework provides a defense-in-
depth defense approach against the studied attacks. The resilient control scheme consists of an 
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attack response scheme, a decision-making logic and a set of controllers. The attack response 
isolates the tampered measurements and replaces them by estimated or reconstructed values. 
The decision-making logic responds to the anomalies identified by the detection scheme and 
subsequently triggers the desirable control modes. Corresponding controllers are then switched 
to mitigate the attacks and maintain the safety of the system.  
Results have shown that the proposed framework is effective to defend against insider attacks 
on sensors. This multi-layered defensive framework addresses the security enhancement 
strategies including attack prevention, detection, response and mitigation, which provide a 
defense-in-depth protection against insider attacks. The attack-resilient control system 
integrates the security and safety solutions together, to mitigate attack impacts and maintain 
the system in a safe state effectively.  
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Chapter 8  
8 Conclusions and Future Work 
8.1 Conclusions 
The research reported in this dissertation is comprised of theoretical study and experimental 
evaluation of an attack-resilient control system design, analysis and demonstration. The 
contributions of this work can be summarized as follows. 
8.1.1 Theoretical analysis and design  
(1) Security of cyber-physical systems has been investigated and related issues are analyzed.  
This work presents the existing research work related to insider attacks. Vulnerabilities of 
systems are analyzed to determine potential ways for security enhancements. Existing security 
solutions, including attack prevention, attack detection and attack mitigation strategies are 
investigated.  
System vulnerabilities are important factors for the security enhancement solutions, and from 
the existing security solutions, some insights can be extracted to strength the system security 
situation. 
(2) A methodology to analyze features of potential insider attacks and their impacts has been 
proposed.  
The methodology is based on system-theoretic and graph-theoretic approaches. Firstly, 
vulnerability analysis related to insider attacks are analyzed for a general cyber-physical 
system. Then, an attack pattern is described for such attacks, which includes attack goals, 
resources, constraints, modes, as well as possible attack paths. Stealthy conditions are analyzed 
in temporal and spatial dimensions, potential impacts of such attacks on the system are 
analyzed using an attack tree. Similarities among different cyber-physical attack scenarios and 
system vulnerabilities have also been examined. 
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This methodology links the attack impacts with system vulnerabilities, which provides insights 
into design of security enhancement strategies. Analysis results of the stealthy conditions 
demonstrate that the limits of insider attacks, and the stealthy condition can also be used as an 
indicator for attack detection schemes. 
(3) An online cross-layer detection scheme has been developed with respect to stealthy insider 
attacks.  
The detection scheme takes on a hierarchical approach by using different detection methods in 
different layers to provide a defense-in-depth detection against the attacks. A model-based 
detection method and a data-driven detection method are employed to detect various anomalies. 
A cross-layer design provides detections from a cyber layer to a physical process. In this 
detection scheme, data-driven and model-based detection methods cooperate to reveal the 
stealthiness of attacks. This methodology has been proven to be effective in detecting both 
spatial stealthy attacks and temporal attacks. 
(4) An attack defensive framework and an attack-resilient control scheme have been proposed. 
To make the system resilient to various insider attacks, a multi-layered defensive framework 
is presented. The framework includes attack prevention, detection, response and mitigation. 
To mitigate the impacts of attacks, an attack-resilient control scheme is provided, in which a 
decision-making scheme is designed to make decisions under various threats, and select a 
suitable attack-resilient controller to mitigate the impacts of attacks. 
The defense-in-depth deployment of the attack-resilient control structure provides layered 
protection for the system. The attack-resilient control system can ensure that the safety-critical 
physical process remains in the safe state in case of attacks. 
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8.1.2 Experimental validation and evaluation 
(1) A design guideline on how to develop a security platform on a cyber-physical system has 
been developed, and a modular approach to design such a platform has been proposed for 
security assessment of cyber-physical systems.  
The developed platform consists of three functional modules: (1) Attack Scenario Generation 
Module, (2) Security Enhancement Module, and (3) Security Evaluation Module. The first 
module can be used to synthesize attack scenarios to identify system vulnerabilities. The 
second module provides various strategies to prevent, detect and mitigate attacks. The third 
module creates a multi-layer systematic environment to analyze and evaluate cyber-physical 
security issues.  
The generalized methodology provides a guideline to develop a security assessment platform. 
Modular design makes the development and implementation flexible. In addition, this platform 
proposes a cross-layer framework, it supports not only cyber-physical security assessment but 
also security enhancement, which makes a diverse and defense-in-depth security study possible.  
(2) A prototype platform has been designed and implemented. 
A prototype platform has been implemented by using a physical component based dynamic 
system simulator, known as nuclear process control test facility (NPCTF). To demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the proposed platform, case studies have been carried out on the proposed 
platform to demonstrate how to perform different security tests for vulnerability assessment 
and security enhancement. Different security scenarios have been designed and evaluated on 
this platform, which bridges a gap between academic research and engineering applications. 
The prototype platform can be extended to other cyber-physical systems. Due to the modular 
design, the proposed generalized modular design is not restricted only to NPCTF, it can be 
used with other cyber-physical systems with appropriate configurations.  
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8.2 Limitations of this work 
Considering the scope and assumptions of this work, there are a few limitations in the current 
work. 
(1) The studied attacks are insider attacks on tampering on sensor data or control signals. 
Detection of these kinds of attacks are based on the safety limits of the system, and the data 
in cyber domain are extracted from the data base in the supervisory station. If the safety 
limits of the system have been manipulated, the detection scheme and mitigation scheme  
would have been misled and lead up to wrong decisions. If the database is attacked, the 
detection and mitigation schemes might be deceived as well. Therefore, it is of importance 
to secure the safety limits and data base in the supervisory station. 
(2) Since the work is focused on attacks a in a single communication channel at a time, when 
multiple sensors are being tampered, the closed loop control might be interrupted into an 
open loop control, the attacker might tamper with the data arbitrarily and/ or launch 
coordinated attacks to bypass or hide their malicious actions. In such situations, the 
detection and mitigation schemes might not be effective anymore. Therefore, study the 
number of sensor attacks that can be detected by the proposed system is necessary in the 
future work. 
(3) The purpose of this work is to design an attack-resilient control system against the insider 
cyber-physical attacks on sensor data and control commands. Detection and mitigation 
schemes are deployed in supervisory station. It is assumed that the supervisory layer is 
isolated from rest of the system and is secure with respect to the studied attacks. If the 
supervisory station is attacked, the attacker might get control of the whole system and 
arbitrarily change the system configuration. All the data that are received and sent over the 
communication channel can be obtained and modified by the attacker, the proposed work 
might not work anymore.  
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8.3 Future work 
Security of cyber-physical systems is an emerging area of research. While the current work 
presents multiple contributions, continued efforts are still needed. Based on the work so far, 
future research can be directed to the following topics:  
(1) Security analysis 
An attack-defense tree could be used to analyze the security situation of system based on game-
theoretic tools. 
(2) Anomaly detection scheme 
 For detection methods that are based on state estimation, credibility of the observed 
measurement data and the estimated data could be evaluated, to improve the detection rate 
and false alarms. 
 Machine learning techniques can be considered for anomaly detection to online predict 
the system output or classify the system patterns using measurement data. 
(3) Resilient control of cyber-physical systems 
 Security control of communication protocols and attack-resilient control of physical 
process should be integrated to provide a more effective solution against insider attacks. 
 To further enhance the ability against stealthy attacks, online cross-layered detection and 
supervised resilient control techniques should be considered together. A flexible 
reconfiguration structure is needed to accommodate this research.  
 After the detection scheme triggers an alarm, it is important to have techniques to isolate 
and reconstruct the tampered data to ensure the safety operation of the system. More 
research is needed in this area. 
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 Redundant communication and measurement channels can be used for safety-critical 
variables. More research is needed in this area. 
(4) Security platform 
The designed prototype platform can be extended to other applications, such as study on attack 
penetration tests, online reconfiguration of defense strategies, and synthesis of control 
strategies.  
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Code packages*.  
No.  File Name  Files 
A1.1  Attack HMI 
Attack HMI design codes
Attack data processing codes 
UWO Security test interface
A1.2  Attack scripts 
Communication protocol parsing codes 
Attack data processing code package 
Trigger logic design
Attack scripts for attack scenarios in the dissertation 
A1.3  Activation switch  Activation switch PCB design and configuration Activation switch configuration codes 
A1.4  ABB AC700F DCS program configuration 
OPC interface design 
Anomaly detection HMI design
Mitigation reconfiguration program 
A1.5   Defense programs 
OPC communication codes 
Data collection and processing codes 
Detection codes for different detection methods 
Mitigation codes
Results demonstration codes 
A1.6  Snort environment settings  Snort rules 
* Considering the security of the designed platform and security of NPCTF,  the developed 
code is not publicized. Please contact UWO CIE Lab for more information if necessary.  
Appendix B: Demo videos.  
No.  Video Name  Links
B1.1  Demo for security platform design 
http://cies‐western‐eng.ca/xirong/file1.mp4 
B1.2  Demo for security tests  http://cies‐western‐eng.ca/xirong/file2.mp4 
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